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FACEBOOK AND INTERPERSONAL 
PRIVACY: WHY THE THIRD PARTY 
DOCTRINE SHOULD NOT APPLY 
Monu Bedi* 
Abstract: Do communications over social networking sites such as Face-
book merit Fourth Amendment protection? The Supreme Court has not 
directly answered this question and lower courts are not in agreement. 
The hurdle is the Third Party Doctrine, which states that a person does 
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in any communication vol-
untarily disclosed to a person or entity. All Internet communications are 
stored on third party servers or Internet service providers, and thus would 
seemingly lose Fourth Amendment protection. Numerous scholars have 
weighed in on the issue—analyzing the nature of the communication or 
the entity to which the information is disclosed—in an effort to show that 
these communications continue to merit Fourth Amendment protection. 
These scholars, however, have largely ignored the overall effect of com-
munications over social networking sites such as Facebook. This Article 
steps outside traditional Fourth Amendment scholarship and relies on 
the concept of interpersonal privacy rights as a way to protect communi-
cations over social networking platforms. Because social scientists have 
recognized that these relationships share the same qualitative structure 
and can be just as “real” as their face-to-face counterparts, this Article 
makes the argument that the concept of interpersonal privacy should ap-
ply to social networking relationships over the Internet. This analysis pro-
vides a new way to apply the reasonable expectation of privacy test under 
the Fourth Amendment—one that avoids the common pitfalls associated 
with the Third Party Doctrine. 
Introduction 
 Fourth Amendment protection has proven difficult to apply in the 
Internet context. The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
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protects “against unreasonable searches and seizures.”1 The basic prob-
lem stems from the fact that almost all communications over the Inter-
net—including messages over such sites as Facebook, Gmail, and Hot-
mail—are stored for various lengths of time on third party servers or 
Internet service providers (“ISPs”).2 These are proprietary systems 
owned by the respective provider (e.g., Facebook, Gmail) that house 
the information so that it can be delivered to its destination.3 The ques-
tion for scholars has been whether these communications continue to 
merit privacy protection, despite this disclosure to a third party.4 This 
Article relies on the concept of interpersonal privacy to show that these 
communications continue to merit Fourth Amendment protection de-
spite their disclosure. 
 The connection between disclosure and privacy has its roots in U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent from the middle of the twentieth century, 
well before the arrival of the Internet.5 The basic premise has not 
changed. Dubbed the Third Party Doctrine, it states that a person loses 
Fourth Amendment protection—i.e., does not have a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy—to any communications that the person voluntary dis-
closes to another.6 This information can be obtained without a warrant 
supported by probable cause and can be used against the individual at 
trial.7 The paradigmatic case—and where the doctrine was initially ap-
plied—deals with government agents.8 A person loses protection to any 
communication disclosed to an agent, even if the agent was undercover 
and the agent’s intentions were unknown to the individual.9 It is only 
relevant that the individual willingly made the communication to the 
informant.10 
  In 1979, in Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court extended this 
doctrine to include information voluntarily disclosed to automated ma-
                                                                                                                      
1 U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
2 See infra notes 114–129 and accompanying text. 
3 See infra notes 114–129 and accompanying text. 
4 See infra notes 130–209 and accompanying text. 
5 See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302–03 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 
U.S. 206, 210–12 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438–39 (1963); On Lee v. 
United States, 343 U.S. 747, 753–54 (1952). 
6 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (stating that an individual does not 
have a Fourth Amendment privacy interest in information that is conveyed to a third party 
and later conveyed by that third party to the government); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 
745, 750–52 (1971). 
7 Miller, 425 U.S. at 443; see infra note 53. 
8 See infra notes 76–89 and accompanying text. 
9 See Miller, 425 U.S. at 443; White, 401 U.S. at 750–52; Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 300–03. 
10 See Miller, 425 U.S. at 443; infra notes 76–89 and accompanying text. 
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chines.11 A thirty-year old opinion, Smith remains the reigning prece-
dent to explain communications transmitted over the Internet.12 Be-
cause Internet communications are also voluntarily disclosed to ma-
chines in the form of ISPs, arguably under Smith users appear to lose 
any Fourth Amendment protection in these communications.13 The 
government would therefore be constitutionally free to acquire these 
communications from the third-party service provider without first ob-
taining a warrant, and to use the information against a person at trial.14 
 Despite Smith’s implication that the Third Party Doctrine extends 
to Internet communications, the Supreme Court has not directly ruled 
on this issue and lower courts have disagreed on how to interpret the 
Third Party Doctrine in the Internet context.15 In 2012, the Court is-
sued its most recent decision on technology and the Fourth Amend-
ment, United States v. Jones, in which it held that placing a Global Posi-
tioning Satellite (“GPS”) tracker on a defendant’s car without a warrant 
violated the Fourth Amendment.16 Yet this decision did not settle the 
issue. The justices concurring in Jones raised meaningful concerns 
about the viability of the Third Party Doctrine in today’s technology-
dominated world.17 
 This issue is particularly important because so many individuals 
across the world now use social networking sites, including Myspace, 
                                                                                                                      
11 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744–46 (1979); see infra notes 90–106 and accom-
panying text. 
12 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 741–46. 
13 See infra notes 114–129 and accompanying text. 
14 The third party server may have its own rules (as Facebook does) that could curtail 
the government from freely acquiring the information, or Congress could pass legislation 
protecting these communications, though these barriers would not be constitutionally 
mandated. See infra notes 210–262 and accompanying text. 
15 See, e.g., Smith, 442 U.S. at 745–46; United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 287–88 
(6th Cir. 2010) (holding that under certain circumstances, an ISP’s control over and access 
to e-mails will not be sufficient to overcome a user’s expectation of privacy in those e-
mails); Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 904–06 (9th Cir. 2008) (hold-
ing that users of text messaging services have a reasonable expectation of privacy in those 
text messages), rev’d sub nom. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010); United 
States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 509–11 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that computer surveil-
lance that captured the “to” and “from” addresses of e-mails, the IP addresses of websites 
an individual visited, and the total amount of data that was transmitted to and from that 
account did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search); United States v. Hambrick, No. 
99-4793, 2000 WL 1062039, at *4 (4th Cir. Aug. 3, 2000) (holding that a person does not 
have a privacy interest in the account information conveyed to an ISP); infra notes 130–
209 and accompanying text. 
16 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949–54 (2012). 
17 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 962–63 (Alito, J., con-
curring); infra notes 263–283 and accompanying text. 
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Facebook, and Google+.18 These types of platforms have revolutionized 
how people communicate and develop relationships.19 Users on such 
sites have the ability to send messages, post status updates, post pic-
tures, and video conference, among other things.20 Although many so-
cial networking users believe that their communications will remain 
privately held by the ISP and free from government intrusion, under 
the Third Party Doctrine, all of these communications seem to lose 
Fourth Amendment protection because users voluntarily disclose this 
information to ISPs.21 
 Scholars have taken wide and varied approaches to this disclosure 
problem in the Internet context.22 Some have focused on the nature of 
the Internet entity to whom the disclosure is made,23 whereas others 
have focused on distinguishing the type of information disclosed.24 Still 
others have argued that disclosure to ISPs is qualitatively different from 
disclosure to government agents.25 The common thread among most 
of these theories is that they confine themselves to analyzing the dis-
crete transmission itself in an attempt to extend Fourth Amendment 
protection.26 
 Few scholars, however, have introduced interpersonal privacy into 
a discussion of the Fourth Amendment.27 These discussions have typi-
                                                                                                                      
18 See, e.g., Vic Gundotra, Welcome Nik Software!, Google+ (Sept. 17, 2012, 11:34 AM), 
https://plus.google.com/+VicGundotra/posts/2YWhK1K3FA5 (noting that Google+ has 
over four billion users and one million active monthly users); Key Facts, Facebook, http:// 
newsroom.fb.com/content/default.aspx?NewsAreaId=22 (last visited Dec. 22, 2012) (not-
ing that Facebook had one billion monthly users as of October 2012). 
19 See infra notes 382–423 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 382–423 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 114–129 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 130–209 and accompanying text. 
23 See Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 Iowa L. Rev. 581, 611–19 
(2011) (arguing that Internet communications that are not viewed by a human observer 
remain private for purposes of the Fourth Amendment). 
24 See Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62 
Stan. L. Rev. 1005, 1017–31 (2010) (arguing that the content/non-content distinction 
should be applied to Internet communications); Matthew J. Tokson, The Content/Envelope 
Distinction in Internet Law, 50 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2105, 2162–63 (2009) (arguing that 
courts could limit the Third Party Doctrine reasoning in Smith by applying it only to non-
content information); see also infra notes 165–181 and accompanying text (discussing the 
content/non-content distinction). 
25 See Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the Web and Other Fourth Amendment Impli-
cations of Technosocial Change, 70 Md. L. Rev. 614, 654–64 (2011) (arguing that social net-
working sites have become akin to an extension of the home and, therefore, that the Third 
Party Doctrine should not be applied as strictly in this context). 
26 See Kerr, supra note 24, at 1017–31; Strandburg, supra note 25, at 654–64; Tokson, 
supra note 23, at 611–19; Tokson, supra note 24, at 2162–63. 
27 See infra notes 337–375 and accompanying text. 
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cally been confined to general arguments about the inherent tension 
between this type of privacy and Fourth Amendment rights.28 No 
scholar appears to have specifically linked interpersonal privacy to so-
cial networking communications over sites like Facebook. 
 Given Facebook’s popularity, this Article will focus on Facebook 
and its related functions and policies as the exemplar of this type of so-
cial networking. But no one can predict the future, and there could be 
other social networking platforms that further change how people in-
teract on the Internet. The arguments in this Article regarding Fourth 
Amendment protection for Internet communications would apply with 
equal force not only to current social networking platforms but also to 
any future ones.29 At its core, this Article grapples with general issues of 
relationship formation on the Internet and related privacy protection. 
 This Article uses the concept of interpersonal privacy to examine 
how to extend Fourth Amendment protection to Facebook communica-
tions.30 The term “interpersonal privacy” is used broadly and encom-
passes the Court’s protection of relationships and the expressive auton-
omy associated with them. Interpersonal privacy has a history separate 
and apart from the privacy associated with the Fourth Amendment.31 It 
focuses on interpersonal relationships and the accompanying issues of 
identity and autonomy, and is grounded in the Due Process, Equal Pro-
tection, and First Amendment Clauses of the Constitution.32 
                                                                                                                      
 
28 Thomas P. Crocker, From Privacy to Liberty: The Fourth Amendment After Lawrence, 57 
UCLA L. Rev. 1, 9 (2010) (stating that the conceptions of “privacy” under interpersonal 
privacy and under the Fourth Amendment are not always the same); Jonathan W. Penney, 
Privacy and New Virtualism, 10 Yale J.L. & Tech. 194, 240 (2008) (noting that there is a 
distinction between personal privacy and informational privacy). 
29 In fact, as social networking on the Internet becomes more prevalent and the plat-
forms used more multifaceted, the theory proposed in this Article will apply with even 
greater force. 
30 See infra notes 376–488 and accompanying text. 
31 See Crocker, supra note 28, at 9. Compare Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 
(2003) (invalidating a state’s sodomy law as a violation of privacy under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481, 
485–86 (1965) (holding that a state statute prohibiting use of contraceptives violates the 
right to marital privacy grounded in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment), with Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (articu-
lating the two-part reasonable expectation of privacy test to determine whether the Fourth 
Amendment has been violated), and On Lee, 343 U.S. at 753–54 (holding that the defen-
dant’s communications with another at trial that were overheard by an undercover agent 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment). 
32 Scholars have used the terms “decisional interference” or “right of autonomy” to 
discuss the due process/equal protection line of cases. See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of 
Privacy, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 477, 557–59 (2006); infra notes 288–303 and accompanying text. 
The term “interpersonal privacy” as used in this Article encompasses this type of autonomy 
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 The Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas stands as 
one of the seminal expressions of this privacy right.33 In Lawrence, the 
Court overturned a government prohibition against sodomy, reasoning 
that this government intrusion endemically interfered with an individ-
ual’s right to define his or her relationships.34 Other interpersonal pri-
vacy cases invoking First Amendment and equal protection principles 
further entrenched this right as one protecting essential qualities of 
relationships.35 
 This Article interprets these cases, collectively and broadly, and 
argues that interpersonal privacy applies to Facebook relationships and 
their constituent communications. Social scientists and psychologists 
alike have recognized that Facebook relationships can have the same 
qualitative structure as traditional face-to-face relationships.36 Both 
types of relationships can share similar depth, breadth, and quality.37 If 
the Court values the interpersonal bonds that arise from traditional 
relationships and seeks to protect how individuals can define such rela-
tionships, it stands to reason that relationships formed through social 
networking sites such as Facebook should also be valued when applying 
the Fourth Amendment.38 
 The argument makes two key moves. First, relying on the concept 
of interpersonal privacy, this Article argues that communications that 
are constituent of Facebook relationships are deserving of some special 
consideration when applying the Fourth Amendment reasonable ex-
pectation test.39 Second, disclosure to the ISP—which is absent from 
traditional face-to-face relationships—should not vitiate privacy protec-
                                                                                                                      
but also includes the rights of expressive associations grounded in First Amendment prin-
ciples. See infra notes 289–336 and accompanying text. 
33 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578–79. 
34 See id. 
35 See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 
U.S. 609, 617–29 (1984); infra notes 305–336 and accompanying text. 
36 See infra notes 382–423 and accompanying text. 
37 See John A. Bargh & Katelyn Y.A. McKenna, The Internet and Social Life, 55 Ann. Rev. 
Psychol. 573, 586–87 (2004). 
38 See infra notes 376–488 and accompanying text. This Article does not argue that 
Facebook relationships actually merit substantive due process or First Amendment protec-
tion. This would mute any discussion of Fourth Amendment protection because another 
constitutional principle—such as substantive due process—could be invoked to protect 
these communications from government intrusion. The arguments in this Article could be 
applied toward such a conclusion, but this is not my aim. Here, the invocation of interper-
sonal privacy is more appropriately described as a conceptual and instructive tool that 
supports Fourth Amendment protection under the reasonable expectation of privacy test. 
39 See infra notes 376–488 and accompanying text. 
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tion because this entity serves no part in the relationship.40 The aim of 
the proposal is not to elevate Facebook relationships over their tradi-
tional face-to-face counterparts. Quite the contrary, the point is only to 
put Facebook relationships on equal footing with face-to-face relation-
ships in terms of privacy protection. Facebook relationships should 
bear the same risks and burdens as traditional relationships when it 
comes to government intrusion. 
 To be clear, relationships on social networking sites like Facebook 
cannot fully be analogized to the traditional, private face-to-face rela-
tionships found in cases such as Lawrence. There are material differ-
ences. For instance, relationships on Facebook can involve a large group 
of individuals who may all have access to significant amounts of personal 
information. The relationships also do not take place in a private physi-
cal  space, such as an individual’s home. But privacy cases like Law-
rence—similar to Fourth Amendment cases like Smith—never envisioned 
the sociological implications of Internet networking sites such as Face-
book. These interpersonal privacy concepts—at least in the context of 
applying the Fourth Amendment—are thus ripe for updating in light of 
today’s technology-based world. 
 In modern times, communications on social networking sites, 
taken together, are more than the sum of their parts. Unlike traditional 
communications (e.g., phone, letter), these transmissions do not 
merely facilitate a face-to-face relationship but rather are constituent of 
the relationship. Indeed, for many users—particularly younger indi-
viduals—Facebook has replaced the need for physical interactions as a 
means to develop and sustain relationships.41 Invoking the concept of 
interpersonal privacy when discussing online relationships ultimately 
provides a new way to apply Fourth Amendment protection and the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test—one that protects Facebook re-
lationships to the same degree as traditional relationships. 
 The Article consists of four parts. Part I traces the history of the 
Third Party Doctrine and its basic application to Fourth Amendment 
protection.42 Part II discusses how this doctrine applies in the Internet 
context, and particularly to social networking sites like Facebook.43 In 
addition, this Part examines the legislative reactions to Internet privacy 
as well as scholarly arguments on how best to apply the Fourth Amend-
                                                                                                                      
40 See infra notes 452–462 and accompanying text. 
41 See infra notes 382–423 and accompanying text. 
42 See infra notes 49–106 and accompanying text. 
43 See infra notes 107–283 and accompanying text. 
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ment to Internet communications.44 It also discusses United States v. 
Jones, the Court’s most recent case on technology and privacy.45 Part III 
summarizes the history of the Supreme Court’s interpersonal privacy 
doctrine and how courts and scholars have understood this doctrine as 
one that protects interpersonal relationships more broadly.46 Finally, 
Part IV explains why this concept of privacy should apply to Facebook 
(and similar) communications and what sets these communications 
apart from other Internet transmissions.47 It goes on to reevaluate the 
Fourth Amendment’s reasonable expectation of privacy using the con-
cept of interpersonal privacy, and concludes by providing a real-world 
application of the theory.48 
I. Fourth Amendment and the Third Party Doctrine 
 This Part examines the history of the Third Party Doctrine and 
how it applies to Fourth Amendment protection.49 Section A discusses 
the change in Fourth Amendment protection from spatial privacy to 
the reasonable expectation of privacy test and the emergence of the 
Third Party Doctrine.50 Section B examines how the Supreme Court 
has applied the Third Party Doctrine to conversations and personal 
documents and records.51 Finally, Section C summarizes the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Smith v. Maryland in which the Court extended the 
Third Party Doctrine to disclosures made to third party machines.52 
A. Spatial Privacy and Katz v. United States 
 Historically, the Fourth Amendment only protected private citizens 
from unwarranted government intrusion into their physical property.53 
Any such intrusion necessitated a warrant based on probable cause, 
issued by a magistrate.54 Scholars have dubbed this type of privacy “spa-
                                                                                                                      
 
44 See infra notes 130–209, 230–262 and accompanying text. 
45 See infra notes 263–283 and accompanying text. 
46 See infra notes 284–375 and accompanying text. 
47 See infra notes 382–470 and accompanying text. 
48 See infra notes 471–488 and accompanying text. 
49 See infra notes 53–106 and accompanying text. 
50 See infra notes 53–75 and accompanying text. 
51 See infra notes 76–89 and accompanying text. 
52 See infra notes 90–106 and accompanying text. 
53 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465–66 (1928). 
54 U.S. Const. amend. IV; United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 105–07 (1965). The 
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that “The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
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tial privacy.”55 This conception of privacy was principally articulated in 
1928 in Olmstead v. United States, in which the Supreme Court held that 
Fourth Amendment protection applied only to a person’s property.56 
In this case, the government, without a warrant, tapped Olmstead’s 
phone lines by making physical intrusions into sections of the phone 
lines that were not on Olmstead’s property.57 The Court held that the 
government was free to intercept and record these conversations with-
out first seeking a warrant because it did not trespass on Olmstead’s 
property.58 
 Olmstead led the way for other decisions relating to face-to-face 
conversations with government agents.59 Under those decisions, as long 
as agents did not trespass on a person’s property, individuals did not 
have Fourth Amendment protection in what they disclosed to an un-
dercover informant, irrespective of the individual’s belief that the in-
formant would not disclose the information.60 Any such information 
could be gathered without a warrant and subsequently used against the 
person at trial.61 As the Court articulated, “a wrongdoer’s misplaced 
belief that a person to whom he voluntary confides his wrongdoing will 
                                                                                                                      
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. There are narrow exceptions 
to the warrant requirement (e.g., automobile exception, exigency), but invocation of any 
such exception assumes that Fourth Amendment protection would otherwise apply. See 
Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 106–07. If there were no reasonable expectation of privacy in the first 
instance, there would be no need to carve out an exception. See, e.g., Stephen P. Jones, 
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy: Searches, Seizures, and the Concept of Fourth Amendment Stand-
ing, 27 U. Mem. L. Rev. 907, 950–51 (1997); Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment 
Protection, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 503, 507–08 (2007). 
55 See Will Thomas DeVries, Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age, 18 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 
283, 284–87 (2003); Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1193, 1022 (1998). Implicit in this notion of privacy would be the protection of per-
sonal “papers” that may contain private information. See DeVries, supra, at 288; infra notes 
76–89 and accompanying text. The idea of personal information as physically separable 
from “the information’s subject” is a slightly different concept and took longer to develop. 
DeVries, supra, at 288. This type of “informational privacy” is not the subject of this Article 
and is more appropriately governed by federal statutes, such as the Privacy Act of 1974. See 
5 U.S.C.A. § 552a (2012). 
56 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464–65. 
57 Id. at 456–57. 
58 Id. at 464–66. 
59 See Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302–03; Lewis, 385 U.S. at 210–11; Lopez, 373 U.S. at 438–39; On 
Lee, 343 U.S. at 751–55. 
60 See, e.g., Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302–03; Lewis, 385 U.S. at 210–11. Using deceit to enter a 
defendant’s property does not constitute a trespass and therefore any information dis-
closed to the government agent upon entry would not violate the Fourth Amendment. 
E.g., Lewis, 385 U.S. at 209–10; On Lee, 343 U.S. at 752–53. 
61 Lopez, 373 U.S. at 438–40. 
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not reveal it” receives no protection under the Fourth Amendment.62 
This became known as the “Third Party Doctrine,” which states that the 
Fourth Amendment does not protect information a person voluntarily 
discloses to a third party, even if the government later acquires the in-
formation from the third party.63 
 In 1967, the Supreme Court dramatically reconceptualized Fourth 
Amendment analysis in Katz v. United States.64 The Court no longer re-
stricted Fourth Amendment protection to a person’s property or physi-
cal space; rather, the Court applied Fourth Amendment protection 
more broadly to any situation in which an individual had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.65 As the Court famously observed, the Fourth 
Amendment “protects people, not places.”66 
 In Katz, the defendant was making illegal gambling bets from a 
phone booth that, unbeknownst to him, the government was monitor-
ing, without a warrant, using a device attached to the outside of the 
booth.67 The Court held that such recordings violated the defendant’s 
Fourth Amendment right to privacy.68 In a concurrence supporting this 
holding, Justice John Marshall Harlan II articulated the now well-known 
two-part test for when Fourth Amendment protection applies: a person 
must have a subjective expectation of privacy in the communication and 
the expectation must be objectively reasonable.69 Even though the gov-
ernment agents did not trespass on the defendant’s property, the con-
text in which the communication was made and the defendant’s actions 
suggested that Fourth Amendment protection was appropriate.70 The 
defendant “occupie[d] [the telephone booth], shut the door behind 
him, and pa[id] the toll that permits him to place a call.”71 Therefore, 
the Court reasoned, the defendant subjectively believed that his conver-
                                                                                                                      
62 Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 414; see Junichi P. Semitsu, From Facebook to Mug Shot: How the Dearth of 
Social Networking Privacy Rights Revolutionized Online Government Surveillance, 31 Pace L. Rev. 
291, 330–32 (2011) (discussing the misplaced trust doctrine and how that does not curtail 
application of the Third Party Doctrine). 
63 White, 401 U.S. at 749; Tokson, supra note 23, at 583–85 (discussing the history of 
the Third Party Doctrine). 
64 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. 
65 See id. at 353; see also id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (articulating the two-part ex-
pectation of privacy test). 
66 Id. at 351 (majority opinion). 
67 See id. at 348, 352–53, 354 n.14, 356. 
68 See id. at 359. 
69 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
70 See Katz, 398 U.S. at 352. 
71 Id. at 352. 
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sation was private and this belief was objectively reasonable.72 Accord-
ingly, the government was required to obtain a warrant before intercept-
ing the call.73 
 Although Katz expanded the conception of Fourth Amendment 
protection, it did not raise the Third Party Doctrine.74 The Court did 
not address its applicability because the defendant did not knowingly 
make his call in the presence of government agents.75 
B. Early Development of the Third Party Doctrine 
 Shortly after Katz, in 1971, in United States v. White, the Supreme 
Court explicitly made clear that the Third Party Doctrine survived the 
new expectation of privacy test.76 In White, a government informant 
used a radio transmitter to surreptitiously transmit conversations with 
the defendant at various locations, including the defendant’s home.77 
The Court found no Fourth Amendment violation in using these con-
versations at trial because the defendant voluntarily disclosed the in-
formation to a third party, which vitiated any reasonable expectation of 
privacy.78 
 In 1976, in United States v. Miller, the Court extended the Third 
Party Doctrine beyond conversations to include personal documents 
and records conveyed to third parties.79 In Miller, by voluntarily disclos-
ing records to a bank, the defendant lost any claim of Fourth Amend-
ment protection as to those documents.80 The Court stated that it did 
not matter that the defendant disclosed these records to the bank for a 
limited purpose, such as financial security.81 His misplaced subjective 
belief or trust did not change the fact that once he conveyed the in-
formation, he took the risk that the government may obtain it from the 
                                                                                                                      
72 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see id. at 352 (majority opinion). 
73 Id. at 358. There are exceptions to the warrant requirement (e.g., consent, exigent 
circumstances) that were not applicable here. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 
(1984) (citing cases that discuss the various warrant exceptions). 
74 See generally Katz, 398 U.S. 347 (failing to discuss the Third Party Doctrine). 
75 See id. at 352. 
76 White, 401 U.S. at 750. 
77 Id. at 746–47. 
78 Id. at 751–52. 
79 See Miller, 425 U.S. at 442–43. 
80 Id. 
81 See id. at 443. It does not matter if the individual revealed the information “on the 
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the 
third party will not be betrayed.” Id. 
12 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:1 
bank.82 Thus, the Court held that the defendant could not object to 
the government’s warrantless seizure of these documents.83 
 Given the Court’s opinion in Miller, some scholars have treated the 
Third Party Doctrine as a doctrine of consent or waiver.84 Understood 
in this way, a person “consents” or “waives” his or her right to Fourth 
Amendment protection over the communication when he or she dis-
closes it to a third party.85 It is not relevant that the individual releases 
the information for a limited purpose or with limited knowledge—the 
voluntary nature of the disclosure vitiates all privacy protection for the 
communication.86 
 This loss of protection also applies to information exposed to the 
public at large.87 The Court, for instance, has ruled that a driver does 
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her movements 
through public streets.88 The voluntary act of driving in public suggests 
the driver has consented to his or her subsequent movements being 
monitored without any Fourth Amendment protection.89 
C. The Third Party Doctrine and Technology: The Automation Rationale 
 The 1979 Supreme Court decision, Smith v. Maryland, applied the 
Third Party Doctrine to technological advancements.90 In Smith, the 
government requested that the phone company set up a “pen register,” 
a device intended to record all outgoing phone numbers dialed by the 
defendant from his home.91 The device was installed at the phone 
                                                                                                                      
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 440–43. 
84 See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 561, 588–
90 (2009); Sonia K. McNeil, Privacy and the Modern Grid, 25 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 199, 216–18 
(2011). 
85 See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 84, at 588–90 (arguing that the Third Party Doctrine 
should be viewed as a form of consent where the disclosure eliminates expectations of 
privacy because the target voluntarily consents to the disclosure); McNeil, supra note 84, at 
216–18 (discussing and ultimately disagreeing with the argument that the Third Party Doc-
trine should be interpreted as a doctrine of consent). 
86 See Kerr, supra note 84, at 588–89 (discussing that a person consents or waives his or 
her right to privacy when that person discloses information to an informant, even if he or 
she does not know that the person is working for the government). 
87 See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983); United States v. Cowan, 
674 F.3d 974, 955–56 (8th Cir. 2012). 
88 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281–82; see infra notes 263–283 and accompanying text. 
89 See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281–82. 
90 442 U.S. at 744–46. 
91 Id. at 737. This device records the numbers dialed by monitoring the impulses 
caused when the dial on the telephone is released. Id. at 736 n.1. The device does not re-
cord the conversations that take place after a call has been made. Id. 
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company’s offices; at no point did the government enter the defen-
dant’s property.92 
 The Court upheld the warrantless use of the pen register, stating 
that the Fourth Amendment did not protect the numbers dialed by the 
telephone user.93 Applying the two-part Katz test, the Court held that 
the defendant did not have a subjective expectation of privacy in the 
dialed numbers, nor would any such expectation be reasonable.94 Tele-
phone users realize that they must convey the number to the telephone 
company in order to make a call and that the company has facilities for 
making permanent records of the numbers dialed.95 
 Further, and more importantly, the Court held that any subjective 
expectation of privacy (assuming one existed) was not something soci-
ety would find reasonable.96 Citing Miller, the Court concluded that the 
defendant did not satisfy the second element of the Katz test because 
he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the dialed num-
bers.97 The Court explained, that “[w]hen he used his phone, [the de-
fendant] voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone 
company and ‘exposed’ that information to its equipment in the ordi-
nary course of business.”98 Accordingly, the defendant waived any right 
to privacy protection.99 
 Because the individual voluntarily disclosed the information to a 
third person, the information was no longer secret, and the government 
could obtain the information without violating the Fourth Amend-
ment.100 The fact that the number was disclosed to an automated ma-
chine instead of a human being was of no consequence: 
The switching equipment that processed those numbers is 
merely the modern counterpart of the operator who, in an 
earlier day, personally completed calls for the subscriber. Peti-
tioner concedes that if he had placed his calls through an op-
erator, he could claim no legitimate expectation of privacy. 
We are not inclined to hold that a different constitutional re-
                                                                                                                      
92 Id. at 741. 
93 Id. at 745–46. 
94 Id. at 741–46. 
95 Id. at 742. 
96 Smith, 442 U.S. at 743. 
97 Id. at 743–44. 
98 Id. at 744. 
99 See id. 
100 Id. at 743–46; Tokson, supra note 23, at 609. 
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sult is required because the telephone company has decided 
to automate.101 
This point is critical to the holding in Smith.102 The Court did not ad-
dress whether a human being actually observed the number being di-
aled.103 This apparently was not relevant.104 All that mattered was that 
the defendant voluntarily exposed the number to a third party’s ma-
chine—in this case, the telephone company’s switching equipment.105 
The implication here is that an individual will likely lose Fourth 
Amendment protection as to any information he or she exposes to a 
third party’s machine in the normal course of business, regardless of 
whether a human actually observes the information.106 
II. Facebook and the Third Party Doctrine 
 How courts should apply the Third Party Doctrine in the Internet 
context has proven difficult to determine.107 This Part examines the 
applicability of the Third Party Doctrine to the Internet context, using 
Facebook as an example.108 Section A examines the strict application of 
the Third Party Doctrine to social networking communications.109 Sec-
tion B then discusses the various approaches taken by lower courts and 
scholars in applying the Third Party Doctrine to Internet communica-
tions and information.110 Section C summarizes Facebook’s privacy 
policies and evaluates how such policies would intersect with the Third 
Party Doctrine.111 Section D then examines how certain provisions of 
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act would apply to social net-
working communications.112 Last, Section E analyzes the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s 2012 decision, United States v. Jones, which held that installing a 
GPS tracking device in an individual’s car without a warrant violated 
the Fourth Amendment.113 
                                                                                                                      
101 Smith, 442 U.S. 744–45 (citation omitted). 
102 See id. 
103 See id. 
104 See id.; Tokson, supra note 23, at 600. 
105 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 744–45; Tokson, supra note 23, at 600. 
106 Tokson, supra note 23, at 600; see Smith, 442 U.S. at 744–45. 
107 See infra notes 114–283 and accompanying text. 
108 See infra notes 114–283 and accompanying text. 
109 See infra notes 114–127 and accompanying text. 
110 See infra notes 130–209 and accompanying text. 
111 See infra notes 210–229 and accompanying text. 
112 See infra notes 230–262 and accompanying text. 
113 See infra notes 263–283 and accompanying text. 
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A. Storage on the Internet and Third Party Disclosure 
 The Third Party Doctrine has proven difficult to apply in the 
Internet context.114 Nearly all online data is stored somewhere in third-
party servers or ISPs.115 These servers and ISPs consist of proprietary 
systems where information is stored so that it can be delivered to its de-
sired location.116 Commonly used e-mail systems like Gmail, Hotmail, 
and Yahoo utilize these third-party servers and ISPs.117 
 Facebook and other social networking sites work in the same 
way.118 Facebook provides a social networking space that allows users to 
create individual profiles with pictures and other personal information 
and to communicate with other users using a host of various interactive 
tools, including posting status updates or photographs, sending and 
receiving e-mails or instant messages, and video-conferencing.119 Al-
most all of this information is stored (for various lengths of time) in 
private facilities or ISPs owned by Facebook.120 Under a strict applica-
                                                                                                                      
 
114 See Tokson, supra note 23, at 584; infra notes 130–209 and accompanying text. 
115 Tokson, supra note 23, at 585, 602–03; see Preston Gralla, How the Internet 
Works 88–99 (8th ed. 2004) (describing how e-mails are transmitted and stored). 
116 Gralla, supra note 115, at 88–99; Tokson, supra note 23, at 602–03. 
117 See Orin S. Kerr, Lifting the “Fog” of Internet Surveillance: How a Suppression Remedy 
Would Change Computer Crime Law, 54 Hastings L.J. 805, 813–14 (2003) (describing how e-
mails are routed by equipment owned by the ISP that processes their data); Tokson, supra 
note 23, at 602–03 (describing how e-mail service providers, such as Gmail and Hotmail, 
store e-mail data); Privacy Policy, Google, http://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/pri- 
vacy/ (last updated July 27, 2012) (explaining that Gmail scans text of e-mails in order to 
file spam and detect viruses). Even deleted e-mail is at least temporarily stored on third 
party systems. See, e.g., James X. Dempsey, Digital Search & Seizure: Updating Privacy Protec-
tions to Keep Pace with Technology, in 1 Seventh Annual Institute on Privacy Law: Evolv-
ing Laws and Practices in a Security-Driven World, 505, 523 (PLI Intellectual Prop., 
Course Handbook Ser. No. G-865, 2006) (“[S]ince ISPs [such as Gmail and Yahoo] retain 
data for varying lengths of time, and do not always delete email immediately upon request, 
customers may not be aware of whether their email is still stored and thus susceptible to 
disclosure.”); Deirdre K. Mulligan et al., Risks of Online Storage, Comm. ACM, Aug. 2006, at 
112, 112 (“Often, ‘deleted’ email will remain on backup storage unbeknownst to users.”). 
118 See infra notes 119–120 and accompanying text. 
119 See Jonathan Strickland, How Facebook Works, How Stuff Works, http://computer. 
howstuffworks.com/internet/social-networking/networks/facebook1.htm (last visited Dec. 
22, 2012) (describing the features of Facebook and various tools available to users); Pages 
Basics, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/help/387958507939236/ (last visited Dec. 
22, 2012); Video Calling: Basics & Privacy, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/help/ 
439078162792430/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2012). Google’s networking platform (Google+) 
allows for similar types of communications. See New Ways of Sharing, Across All of Google, 
Google+, http://www.google.com/+/learnmore/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2012); see also 
infra notes 382–423 and accompanying text (discussing these features of Facebook and 
how they foster relationships). 
120 See Evan E. North, Note, Facebook Isn’t Your Space Anymore: Discovery of Social Network-
ing Websites, 58 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1279, 1306 (2010) (“Facebook and MySpace, like internet 
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tion of the Third Party Doctrine under Smith, a Facebook user would 
lose Fourth Amendment protection for any communication or infor-
mation transmitted or posted through the social networking site be-
cause the user has knowingly disclosed it to a third party’s storage sys-
tem.121 
 Under a waiver theory, a Facebook user consents to revealing this 
information to the ISP and thus seemingly forfeits any protection over 
                                                                                                                      
service providers (ISP), store vast quantities of personal information on their servers.”). 
Facebook has continued to expand its storage capacity and to increase its budget for the 
maintenance of its data centers. See Rich Miller, Facebook Makes Big Investment in Data Cen-
ters, Data Center Knowledge (Sept. 14, 2009), http://www.datacenterknowledge.com/ 
archives/2009/09/14/facebook-makes-big-investment-in-data-centers/ [hereinafter Miller, 
Facebook Makes Big Investment]; Rich Miller, $20 Million a Year on Data Centers, Data Center 
Knowledge (May 18, 2009), http://www.datacenterknowledge.com/archives/2009/05/ 
18/facebook-20-million-a-year-on-data-centers/; Adam Ostrow, How Facebook Serves Up Its 15 
Billion Photos, Mashable Social Media (Apr. 30, 2009), http://mashable.com/2009/04/ 
30/facebook-photo-sharing (discussing how Facebook stores uploaded photographs). In-
deed, Facebook acknowledges that it may share information in response to a legal request 
if the site has a good faith basis to believe that the law requires it. Data Use Policy: Some Other 
Things You Need to Know, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/full_data_use_policy (last 
revised Dec. 11, 2012); see infra notes 210–229 and accompanying text (discussing Face-
book’s privacy policies in further detail). Even deleted Facebook accounts may remain on 
servers for up to ninety days after a user deletes the account. See Data Use Policy: Deleting and 
Deactivating Your Account, supra; Statement of Rights and Responsibilities: Sharing Your Content 
and Information, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms (last revised Dec. 11, 
2012). Yet, it appears that the video chatting content is not stored in any way. Video Calling: 
Basics & Privacy, supra note 119 (noting that the calls themselves are not stored). 
121 See Semitsu, supra note 62, at 329 (arguing that a Facebook user does not have 
Fourth Amendment protection over the majority, if not all, of the content posted on Face-
book “since it is information that a Facebook user voluntarily agrees to have held in third 
party storage”); Strandburg, supra note 25, at 634 (citing scholars who have addressed the 
implications of the Third Party Doctrine in the Internet context and have recognized that 
under a strict interpretation of the doctrine, “there is virtually no Fourth Amendment 
protection for any information conveyed over the Internet or other digital intermediary”). 
It is important to note that all Facebook users agree to terms stating that the company will 
hold their information. Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 120 (“We designed 
our Data Use Policy to make important disclosures about how you can use Facebook to 
share with others and how we collect and can use your content and information.”); see infra 
notes 210–229 and accompanying text. It does not matter how long the third party server 
stores the information; even a temporary disclosure would satisfy the Third Party Doctrine 
and vitiate any Fourth Amendment protection. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 
744 (1979) (noting only that the information was voluntarily disclosed, not the length of 
time that the information had been disclosed); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 
(1976) (same). This loss of Fourth Amendment protection is conceptually different from 
the situation where a Facebook user makes his or her profile publicly viewable. Semitsu, 
supra note 62, at 342–44. Here, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy because the 
evidence is in “plain view.” Id. 
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the transmission.122 The user made a voluntary choice to sign an 
agreement before opening an account, acknowledging that Facebook 
will hold the user’s communications.123 Thus, there would be no consti-
tutional barrier to the government acquiring this information from the 
ISP without a warrant.124 It would not matter if the individual user sub-
jectively expected the communication to remain privately held, and not 
reviewed by the ISP or otherwise disclosed to the government.125 This 
situation is no different from one in which a person makes a disclosure 
to a government informant, erroneously believing that the information 
will be used for a limited purpose or otherwise not used against oneself 
at trial.126 It is not relevant that the person may not have all the facts 
before making this disclosure or does not otherwise recognize the true 
identity of the informant.127 What matters is that the person willingly 
disclosed the information.128 This act, on its own, vitiates any Fourth 
Amendment privacy protection. The same reasoning applies to infor-
mation relayed to an ISP. Under Katz v. United States and its progeny, 
even though subjective expectations may be relevant, a normative 
judgment as to whether the expectation is “objectively reasonable” re-
mains the dispositive factor.129 
B. Responses to the Third Party Doctrine and Internet Privacy 
 The Supreme Court has yet to decide how the Third Party Doctrine 
will impact communications on the Internet, specifically those transmit-
                                                                                                                      
122 See Kerr, supra note 84, at 588–90; Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 
120 (describing Facebook’s terms of usage and incorporating the Data Use Policy); see also 
supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text (discussing the waiver theory of the Third Party 
Doctrine). 
123 See supra note 121 and accompanying text; infra notes 210–229 and accompanying 
text. 
124 See Miller, 425 U.S. at 443. 
125 See id. at 443; United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751–52 (1971). Indeed, at least 
one study has shown that Internet users would consider disclosure by an ISP to be a privacy 
violation. See Tokson, supra note 23, at 622–26. 
126 See Miller, 425 U.S. at 443; White, 401 U.S. at 751–52. 
127 See Miller, 425 U.S. at 443; White, 401 U.S. at 751–52; Kerr, supra note 84, at 588–89. 
128 See Miller, 425 U.S. at 443; Kerr, supra note 84, at 588–89. 
129 Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 & n.5, 743–44 (discussing the two-part test under Katz and 
noting that even if the defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy, it was not objec-
tively reasonable); Tokson, supra note 24, at 2162 (“The Court has stated in several cases 
that a normative judgment under the ‘objectively reasonable’ prong of Katz is generally 
the most important determinant of Fourth Amendment protection, and trumps any con-
trary conclusion based on subjective expectations of privacy.”). 
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ted through social networking sites.130 Scholars and lower courts are not 
in agreement as to how this doctrine should apply in today’s technologi-
cal context, or whether it should apply at all.131 Some appellate courts 
have adopted the Third Party Doctrine when applying the Fourth 
Amendment to Internet communications,132 whereas others have fo-
cused on distinguishing between types of information contained in the 
communication.133 
 The Third Party Doctrine has also generated significant, and some-
times strident, reactions by Fourth Amendment scholars as to its appli-
cation to the Internet.134 These individuals have suggested a variety of 
solutions, including greater positive laws protecting Internet communi-
cations, complete reconceptualizations of how the Fourth Amendment 
should work in the Internet context,135 and outright elimination of the 
doctrine.136 
 This Article does not seek to provide a comprehensive analysis of 
Fourth Amendment doctrine as applied to the Internet. Indeed, this 
type of undertaking would require significant discussion of the preced-
ing scholarship, much of which is not pertinent here. The important 
                                                                                                                      
130 Some scholars argue that the doctrine is unlikely to be overturned. See, e.g., Fred H. 
Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for a Legal Framework, 43 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 
435, 460 (2008); Tokson, supra note 23, at 586. 
131 See infra notes 139–209 and accompanying text. 
132 See infra notes 139–164 and accompanying text. 
133 See infra notes 165–181 and accompanying text. 
134 DeVries, supra note 55, at 309–10 (noting that there is agreement among privacy 
scholars that privacy law must change in the digital age, but that various approaches have 
been proposed). 
135 See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Privacy at Risk: The New Government Sur-
veillance and the Fourth Amendment 151–64 (2007) (discussing subpoenas to third 
parties and the rationale for requiring those entities to disclose to the government); Jack 
M. Balkin, Essay, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 20–21 
(2008) (arguing that legislative action should be taken); Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law 
Through Cyberlaw’s Lens, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1375, 1426–27 (2004) (arguing for stronger 
legislation to protect information in the Internet context); Kerr, supra note 24, at 1019–22 
(arguing for application of a content/non-content distinction); Daniel J. Solove, Digital 
Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1083, 1151–67 
(2002) (articulating a framework under which the Third Party Doctrine should operate 
given the sheer volume of information that is accessible under this doctrine); Daniel J. 
Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s Misguided Call for Judicial Deference, 
74 Fordham L. Rev. 747, 761–77 (2005) (arguing that legislation may be ill-equipped to 
protect information in the Internet context). 
136 See, e.g., Strandburg, supra note 25, at 654–64 (arguing that the Third Party Doc-
trine should not be applied to certain Internet communications); Stephen E. Henderson, 
The Timely Demise of the Fourth Amendment Third Party Doctrine, 96 Iowa L. Rev. Bull. 39, 39–
40 (2011) (celebrating that the Third Party Doctrine “has at least taken ill, and it can be 
hoped it is an illness from which it will never recover”). 
2013] Social Networking, Interpersonal Privacy, & the Third Party Doctrine 19 
takeaway for this analysis is that by and large these theories focus on 
communications as communications when trying to explain why these 
discrete transmissions merit privacy protection.137 
 The Article moves away from this traditional approach in an effort 
to offer a new way of thinking about the reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy test. Although this Article seeks to identify the common problems 
associated with the Third Party Doctrine and its application to Internet 
communications (a frequently discussed theme within this scholar-
ship), its ultimate aim is to posit a solution that focuses on the relation-
ships created by Internet communications over social networking sites 
rather than on the individual transmission standing alone. Accordingly, 
this Article will briefly focus on three representative theories—within 
the conventional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence—that seek to ex-
plain how the doctrine should be applied in the Internet context.138 
1. Automation Versus Human Observer 
 One scholar challenges the premise that merely disclosing data to 
electronic storage facilities vitiates Fourth Amendment protection.139 
That scholar proposes a human observer theory, which argues that 
proper application of the Third Party Doctrine contemplates that the 
disclosure will eventually be exposed to human observation.140 It is this 
ultimate human observation that vitiates an individual’s expectation of 
privacy, not the mere exposure to an automated machine.141 
 Online users transmit voluminous amounts of data over the Inter-
net.142 But this mass of data is stored on third party servers and has a 
low chance of being directly observed by a human being.143 According 
                                                                                                                      
137 One scholar’s account seems to recognize the value of these communications as 
more than just the discrete communication. See Strandburg, supra note 25, at 654–64. But 
this account focuses on the general connection between cyberspace and the real world, 
whereas this Article’s analysis focuses more on the actual relationship formed in cyber-
space. Compare infra notes 182–209 and accompanying text (discussing the technosocial 
theory), with infra notes 382–423 and accompanying text (discussing the role of social 
networking communications in human life). 
138 See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 24, at 1017–29 (arguing for the application of the con-
tent/non-content distinction); Strandburg, supra note 25, at 654–64 (arguing that the 
Third Party Doctrine should not be applied to certain Internet communications); Tokson, 
supra note 23, at 601–19 (arguing that the Third Party Doctrine should apply only to 
communications that are exposed to a human observer). 
139 Tokson, supra note 23, at 616–17. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 See id. at 604–05. 
143 See id. at 604–09. 
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to the human observer theory, the machine cannot truly violate one’s 
privacy.144 These automated systems “cannot see us, think about us, 
judge us, ridicule us, or be curious about us—they cannot perceive us 
at all.”145 It does not make sense then to say that we lose our right to 
privacy when information is simply stored in these machines.146 
 The human observer theory finds support in related Supreme 
Court cases involving technology and surveillance, in which the Court 
has held that a search only occurs after the information was exposed to 
human observation.147 In 1984 in United States v. Karo, for instance, the 
Supreme Court held that merely placing a homing beacon in a con-
tainer that ultimately found its way into the defendant’s possession did 
not violate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights because no gov-
ernment official was monitoring the transmission.148 Only after the po-
lice began to monitor the device in the defendant’s home did they vio-
late the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy.149 Similarly, in 
2001 in Kyllo v. United States, the Court concluded that the defendant 
had no expectation of privacy in the infrared heat wave emanating 
from the defendant’s house.150 The police only violated the defen-
dant’s Fourth Amendment rights when they used a thermal scanner 
outside the defendant’s house to detect activity inside the home.151 
Without this human observation, the mere collection of this informa-
tion by a machine would not violate the Fourth Amendment.152 
                                                                                                                      
144 Id. at 616–17. 
145 Tokson, supra note 23, at 617. 
146 Id. at 616–17. 
147 Id. at 615–16. 
148 See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712–13 (1984). Specifically, the Court has 
stated: 
The mere transfer to [defendant] of a can containing an unmonitored beeper 
infringed no privacy interest. It conveyed no information that [defendant] 
wished to keep private, for it conveyed no information at all. To be sure, it cre-
ated a potential for an invasion of privacy, but we have never held that potential, 
as opposed to actual, invasions of privacy constitute searches for purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment. 
Id. at 712. Further, the government did not trespass on property or person because the 
beeper was placed in a container prior to the defendant taking possession of the container. 
Id. at 708; see Tokson, supra note 23, at 615. 
149 Karo, 468 U.S. at 714–15. 
150 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001); Tokson, supra note 23, at 615. 
151 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34–35; Tokson, supra note 23, at 615. 
152 Tokson, supra note 23, at 615–16. 
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 Appellate courts have yet to adopt this distinction.153 By and large, 
they have simply accepted the automation rationale under Smith v. 
Maryland without a discussion of the relevance of human observa-
tion.154 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, for instance, 
held that certain information in an e-mail—the “to” and “from” lines— 
was not protected by the Fourth Amendment simply because the user 
voluntary conveyed it to third party equipment.155 The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit similarly concluded that a person loses 
any expectation of privacy to an e-mail because of its disclosure to third 
party equipment, without determining whether a human employee ob-
served the information.156 
 It is also not clear how the human observer theory impacts Fourth 
Amendment protection when it comes to Facebook communications. 
Facebook privacy policies explicitly state that the company can use a 
person’s information “as part of [its] efforts to keep Facebook . . . safe 
and secure”157 as well as “share [a user’s] information in response to a 
legal request . . . if [it] ha[s] a good faith belief that the law requires 
[it] to do so.”158 This language suggests that actual employees may at 
any point review the stored data to prevent fraud or to otherwise com-
ply with government requests.159 Does the potential of human observa-
tion change the foregoing analyses?160 Would it matter if employees 
                                                                                                                      
 
153 See, e.g., United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510–11 (9th Cir. 2008); United 
States v. Hambrick, No. 99–4793, 2000 WL 1062039, at *3–4 (4th Cir. Aug. 3, 2000). 
154 See, e.g., Forrester, 512 F.3d at 510–11; Hambrick, 2000 WL 1062039, at *3–4; see also 
Freedman v. Am. Online, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 174, 182–83 (D. Conn. 2005) (holding that 
the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his AOL subscriber in-
formation because his contract with AOL permitted AOL to release the information to 
third parties). 
155 See Forrester, 512 F.3d at 510–11. 
156 See Hambrick, 2000 WL 1062039, at *3–4. The case only involved non-content parts 
of an e-mail. See id. at *3; infra notes 165–181 and accompanying text. 
157 Data Use Policy: How We Use the Information We Receive, supra note 120. 
158 Data Use Policy: Some Other Things You Need to Know, supra note 120. 
159 See Semitsu, supra note 62, at 296, 306 (discussing the potential for Facebook em-
ployees to review data as necessary to comply with the law); Data Use Policy: Some Other 
Things You Need to Know, supra note 120. 
160 As one scholar argues, 
If Tokson is correct that we retain privacy when we give information to third 
parties because computers do not—indeed, cannot—invade privacy, then it 
would seem the government could run machine searches of data without jus-
tification. Perhaps there would be an ultimate human reader, but it would oc-
cur only after the necessary justification, or perhaps in a future system the 
computer would inform officers to focus on a certain threat . . . without re-
vealing any of the searched data. 
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regularly reviewed a specific random sampling content for compliance 
with Facebook policies? 
 Scholars arguing for the need of human observation would surely 
focus on actual observation as the critical element for vitiating Fourth 
Amendment protection, presumably relying on Karo and Kyllo.161 For 
even in Smith, there was the potential that an operator could review the 
dialed numbers.162 The logical question then becomes: what is so unique 
about the status of information actually being observed as opposed to potentially 
being observed when it comes to privacy rights? If the doctrine is best under-
stood as a waiver principle, the situations are identical—the individual 
voluntarily disclosed the information to somebody or something else.163 
Thus, accepting the human observation proposal would also seem to 
overrule Smith, which did not distinguish between disclosure to a ma-
chine and human.164 
2. Content/Non Content Distinction 
 Another scholar provides another prominent response that focuses 
on the old distinction between content and non-content information, 
originally created to protect mail delivered by the U.S. Postal Service.165 
Under long-standing Supreme Court precedent, an individual has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the mail being sent 
but not in what is printed on the face of the envelope, including the 
recipient and mailing address.166 The rationale is that citizens should 
be free to take advantage of the mail system without foregoing privacy 
protections of sealed envelopes.167 
                                                                                                                      
Henderson, supra note 136, at 48. 
161 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34–35; Karo, 468 U.S. at 712–14. 
162 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 744. 
163 See supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text. 
164 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 744–45. The human observation theory argues that Smith 
should be treated as sui generis based on the unique facts, namely human operators for-
merly served in the role that is now performed by machines. Tokson, supra note 23, at 
634–36. It is not clear, however, why this theory dismisses the Court’s broad language as 
irrelevant to the Internet context when it would squarely include ISPs. See Smith, 442 U.S. 
at 744–46. Whether desirable or not, Smith remains precedent for today’s technological 
world, and it must be accounted for accordingly. See id. at 741–46. 
My argument seeks to retain the basic holding in Smith but provides a justification for 
why communications constituent of social networking relationships deserve special atten-
tion, even though the transmission is disclosed to a machine or an ISP. 
165 Kerr, supra note 24, at 1020–31. 
166 See id. at 1022–23; see also Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (holding that 
letters and sealed packages cannot be opened unless the government obtains a warrant). 
167 See United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 251–52 (1970). 
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 To be clear, the content/non-content theory seeks to provide a 
general framework for applying the Fourth Amendment in the Internet 
context; it focuses on applying the traditional conceptions of spatial 
privacy.168 Using this theory, one can analogize the recipient and mail-
ing address on a postal letter to the “to” and “from” address fields in an 
e-mail, both constituting non-content information.169 The content part 
of a mailed letter is analogized to the subject line and body of the e-
mail, both deserving Fourth Amendment protection.170 
 This theory does not necessarily interfere with the proper applica-
tion of the Third Party Doctrine because the crux of the principle re-
mains. An individual still loses her expectation of privacy with certain 
information after handing it to a postal employee or sending it over the 
Internet.171 But, this disclosure is simply restricted to non-content in-
formation and does not apply to the sealed information of a postal let-
ter or the subject line or body of an e-mail.172 It is also of no conse-
quence whether the communication would be disclosed to a machine 
or human being.173 This theory provides a distinction grounded solely 
on the normative principles of content versus non-content.174 In this 
way—and unlike the aforementioned human observation doctrine— 
this theory avoids reliance on empirical determinations associated with 
whether the communication is or will be observed by a human.175 
 Some appellate courts have adopted this approach to explain how 
the Fourth Amendment should apply to communications over the 
                                                                                                                      
168 See Kerr, supra note 24, at 1017–22. The proponent of the content/non-content 
theory for Internet communications analogizes the foundational Fourth Amendment dis-
tinction of inside versus outside (i.e., the doctrine of spatial privacy) to the content versus 
non-content distinction described above. Kerr, supra note 24, at 1017–22. 
169 Id. at 1023; see also United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417–19 (C.A.A.F. 1996) 
(analogizing America Online e-mails to letters). 
170 Kerr, supra note 24, at 1023; see also Semitsu, supra note 62, at 334 (analogizing the 
law on wiretap searches to the law on mail searches). 
171 See Kerr, supra note 24, at 1023 (noting that information like the e-mail header 
would still not be entitled to Fourth Amendment protection). 
172 Kerr, supra note 24, at 1022–23. This doctrine is also consistent with the holding in 
Smith, because the pen register recorded only the phone number or the non-content in-
formation of the call, not the substance of the conversation or the content of the commu-
nication. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 744–45. 
173 See Kerr, supra note 24, at 1017–22. 
174 Id. at 1020. 
175 See id. at 1020–21; Tokson, supra note 23, at 601–19. The proponent of the human 
observation rationale raises this as a potential objection to his theory. Tokson, supra note 
23, at 636–38. Yet this scholar argues that although this theory rests on a purely factual 
assertion (whether or not the information was observed by a human), a court is free to 
apply a normative principle after this initial determination has been made. Id. at 637–38. 
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Internet.176 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, for in-
stance, held that an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the content of an e-mail, even if the message is stored in a third party 
server.177 But, other courts seem to favor a straightforward application 
of the Third Party Doctrine, in which the content of the e-mail also 
does not receive Fourth Amendment protection.178 
 At a conceptual level, the content/non-content distinction works 
well to explain e-mails sent over sites such as Gmail and Yahoo where 
there is a clear “to” and “from” category distinguished from the body of 
the e-mail. But not all communications over social networking sites 
such as Facebook are readily translated into these two categories.179 
How would this theory account for status updates, instant messages, or 
pictures? It is hard to see how the content/non-content distinction 
would apply to these types of communications.180 By analogizing to 
postal letters, the theory assumes that the communication has both 
parts—content and non-content—and that one can easily make this 
distinction.181 But Internet communications over Facebook do not 
work so neatly. Status updates do not seem to have these two types of 
information; neither do instant messages. These types of communica-
tions cannot be separated into component parts in the same way postal 
letters or e-mails can. There would be similar—if not greater—difficulty 
in categorizing pictures posted on Facebook. 
 It will not work to  say simply that the entire communication con-
tains substantive content and thus it should all be protected. This is be-
cause the basic thrust of the theory is working from the analogy to 
postal letters. If the analogy breaks down, so does the rationale for pro-
tecting the content part of the communication. The problem is that 
                                                                                                                      
176 See, e.g., United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010); Quon v. Arch 
Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 904–05 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that users have an 
expectation of privacy in the contents of their text messages), rev’d sub nom. City of Ontario 
v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010) (holding that the search was reasonable and, therefore, 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment). 
177 Warshak, 631 F.3d at 288. An earlier ruling on this issue was vacated on ripeness 
grounds. 490 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated en banc, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008). 
178 See, e.g., Rehberg v. Paulk, 598 F.3d 1268, 1281–82 (11th Cir.), vacated, 611 F.3d 828 
(11th Cir. 2010); In re Search Warrant for Contents of Elec. Mail, 665 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 
1224 (D. Or. 2009) (noting that e-mail users “voluntarily conveyed to the ISPs and exposed 
to the ISP’s employees in the ordinary course of business the contents of their e-mails”). 
179 See Strandburg, supra note 25, at 643 & n.150. The content/non-content theory 
may adequately explain Facebook messages that are sent between users. 
180 See id. (finding that although the content/non-content distinction may work well 
with e-mails, the analogy breaks down with other types of electronic communications). 
181 See id. 
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communications over the Internet, and particularly over social net-
working sites such as Facebook, cannot be reduced to electronic ver-
sions of postal letters—the range of tools is far more varied and com-
plex. The problem with this theory stems from the focus on the dis-
crete transmission itself and its component parts. Working, instead, 
from the perspective of the relationship created by these communica-
tions—as this Article seeks to do—provides a more robust theory for 
protecting these communications. 
3. Technosocial Continuity 
 Another scholar takes a stronger position by arguing against the 
application of the Third Party Doctrine in today’s technological age.182 
The scholar’s basic thesis is that an aggressive application of this doc-
trine fails to appreciate the social role of the Internet, something that 
could not have been appreciated when the doctrine was first articulated 
in United States v. Miller and Smith.183 
 This scholar’s theory—the technosocial continuity theory—argues 
that “[c]yberspace has become a space for social life” and in this way 
“digital and physical social realms are inextricably intertwined.”184 Be-
cause of the prevalence of social media in our lives, the technosocial 
continuity theory finds that cyberspace has become an extension of the 
home or office, places where the Fourth Amendment historically ap-
plies.185 Accordingly, application of the Third Party Doctrine in the so-
cial media context is not appropriate, and it should not aggressively be 
applied.186 
 The technosocial continuity theory further states that third party 
Internet service storage systems are the modern equivalent of landlords 
or other service providers that may share authority over a person’s 
home or other physical space.187 These servers similarly promote and 
sustain the ability of users to transmit information over the Internet 
from one person to another.188 Thus, even though there is a shared 
transmission of information, the disclosure to third party servers 
should not vitiate the sender’s reasonable expectation of privacy.189 
                                                                                                                      
182 Id. at 634–39. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. at 639. 
185 Strandburg, supra note 25, at 654–64. 
186 See id. at 639, 656–57. 
187 See id. at 639–41. 
188 Id. at 641. 
189 See id. 
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 This technosocial continuity theory finds support in Supreme 
Court precedent involving individuals who share premises.190 The 
scholar cites the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision, Georgia v. Randolph, 
where the Court held that the government could not conduct a search 
of the premises where one occupant consented but the other did 
not.191 In addition, other precedent holds that individuals have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in a temporary quarter, even if an owner 
or landlord continues to have a right to enter the property.192 Shared 
use thus does not automatically mean loss of privacy protection, par-
ticularly when the third party, such as a landlord, provides services that 
promote and sustain the property.193 
 This scholar makes a valid point.194 In fact, the ubiquitous nature 
of making disclosures in today’s technology dominated world has led 
some scholars to question whether the Third Party Doctrine should be 
understood as a doctrine of waiver or consent.195 One scholar writes, 
“[e]ven when a person allows a third party access to information . . . it 
does not necessarily mean that either the individual or the third party 
has consented to access by the government. . . . [The doctrine assumes] 
that there was a choice to disclose information to a third party . . . .”196 
This scholar cites to paying electricity bills and depositing money in a 
bank as necessary acts that, under a consent theory, would constitute a 
waiver of all privacy protection for the information.197 Similar reason-
                                                                                                                      
 
190 Id. at 639–41; see, e.g., Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 106 (2006) (holding that 
one co-tenant may not consent to a search over the objection of another present co-
tenant); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96–97 (1990) (holding that an overnight guest 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the host’s home). 
191 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 106; Strandburg, supra note 25, at 639–40. 
192 Strandburg, supra note 25, at 640 & n.138 (collecting cases). 
193 This technosocial continuity theory relies on another scholar’s analysis. See id. at 641. 
In relevant part, that scholar states “entities [digital service providers] are functionally analo-
gous to ‘servants’ who are also encompassed by this conception of shared privacy; unlike the 
servants of centuries ago, they do not reside in the home, but they provide services that pro-
mote and sustain activities within the home.” Id. at 641 (citing Susan W. Brenner, The Fourth 
Amendment in an Era of Ubiquitous Technology, 75 Miss. L.J. 1, 76 (2005)). 
194 Indeed, one may take this scholar’s argument about facilitation a step further and 
focus on the necessity of Internet storage servers. Put simply, without these servers, there 
would be no transmission. See infra notes 452–462 and accompanying text. 
195 See supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text. 
196 McNeil, supra note 84, at 216. 
197 Id. at 216–17. The scholar notes that in order to put money in a bank account, the 
banker must disclose some information to the bank, including one’s name, social security 
number, as well as the various deposits and credits into the account. See id. All of this in-
formation would, therefore, not be protected under the Third Party Doctrine. The alter-
native to making such disclosures, however, is for one to keep the money in a shoebox 
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ing can be applied to Internet communications. Because the ISP is a 
necessary component to the transmission, the Internet user has no real 
choice in making the disclosure.198 
 The merits of this theory would ultimately turn on how one char-
acterizes the nature of the consent. A strict interpretation of the term 
would seem to suggest that a Facebook user has in fact consented to 
disclosing the information.199 Moreover, even though technology 
dominates our lives and there are many instances where one might ar-
gue people must disclose things to other parties to function (e.g., bank 
records, electricity bills), Facebook does not appear to fall into this 
category. No one needs to have a Facebook account to survive. Any use 
of the site would thus suggest a willing disclosure. But regardless of the 
merits of the theory that necessary disclosures should not be subject to 
the Third Party Doctrine, as previously discussed, the Court has not 
adopted such a narrow conception of consent in the Fourth Amend-
ment context.200 Under the current application of the Third Party Doc-
trine, individuals assume the risk in making these disclosures, even if 
these disclosures are an integral part of their lives.201 
 The technosocial theory on its own terms, however, would also not 
seem to protect fully communications from the government’s reach. 
Nothing would seem to stop the government from compelling service-
oriented individuals (e.g., maids, landlords) to divulge incriminating 
information or prevent these individuals from reporting behavior on 
their own accord.202 Similarly, the government would be otherwise free 
to acquire the information from the ISP,203 or this entity itself would be 
free to disclose information to the government.204 In either case, there 
is no constitutional check on the government’s ability to acquire the 
information. 
                                                                                                                      
under one’s bed. Id. at 216. Although this may be an option, it is not a practical option in 
today’s world. Id. at 216–17. 
198 See Miller, Facebook Makes Big Investment, supra note 120 (noting that Facebook has 
extended the number of servers needed for the data on its site); cf. Gralla, supra note 
115, at 88–99 (describing how e-mails are transmitted and stored). 
199 See supra notes 114–129 and accompanying text. 
200 See supra notes 76–89 and accompanying text. 
201 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 744–45; Miller, 425 U.S. at 442–43. Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s 
concurring opinion in United States v. Jones raises concerns about the doctrine as it currently 
stands. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); infra 
notes 263–283 and accompanying text. 
202 Strandburg, supra note 25, at 641; see infra notes 337–375 and accompanying text. 
203 See infra notes 230–262 and accompanying text. 
204 See infra notes 263–283 and accompanying text. 
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 More to the point, the technosocial theory comes at the cost of 
jettisoning the Third Party Doctrine, at least in the context of social 
networking on the Internet.205 The proposing scholar, for example, 
finds that although undercover informants may use chat rooms to 
gather incriminating statements from would-be criminals (e.g., posing 
as an underage child) because chat rooms are not extensions of the 
home or office, similar ploys relating to creation of fake Facebook pro-
files by government agents should not be allowed, presumably because 
Facebook is an extension of the home or office.206 It is not clear why 
these types of disclosures do not stand or fall together, at least from the 
perspective of voluntary disclosure and waiver to the undercover gov-
ernment informant. 
 This Article does not make such a bold claim, nor has the Court 
adopted such a drastic remedy.207 In fact, this Article’s argument pre-
serves most of the doctrine as it stands. It does not seek to thwart gov-
ernment efforts to use fake identities or other deceptive tactics via so-
cial networking sites to solicit information from potential criminals.208 
It simply puts Internet relationships on the same footing as their face-
to-face counterparts while preserving the basic principles behind the 
Third Party Doctrine.209 
                                                                                                                      
 
205 See Strandburg, supra note 25, at 634 (noting that “some courts . . . are beginning to 
move away from a rigid and aggressive third party doctrine and toward an approach con-
sistent with the principle of technosocial continuity”). Another scholar seems to make a 
similar argument. See Semitsu, supra note 62, at 369 (“Courts should view Facebook as the 
twenty-first century equivalent of the phone booth. . . . Today, if Katz’s son sets his Face-
book content to ‘private’ and limits his conversations to trusted friends, he has done the 
equivalent of shutting the phone booth doors.”). As to the application of the Third Party 
Doctrine, like the technosocial continuity theory, this scholar seems to argue that such 
disclosures should not sacrifice a user’s privacy interest. See id. at 369–71. But the scholar 
does not explain why disclosure to an ISP should not vitiate a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, when a similar disclosure made to a pen registry in Smith did. See id. If the scholar’s 
point relates to preventing government surveillance and surreptitious monitoring, that 
argument would also suggest that a person should retain an expectation of privacy in dis-
closures made to an undercover government agent in a face-to-face setting, a view that the 
Court has rejected. White, 401 U.S. at 748–54; On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 750–
53 (1952). 
206 Strandburg, supra note 25, at 670–79. 
207 See id.; infra notes 263–283 and accompanying text; infra notes 376–488 and accom-
panying text. But the Supreme Court’s most recent decision on privacy and technology, 
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, suggests a reevaluation of the Third Party Doctrine in light of the 
pervasive use of the Internet. See infra notes 263–283 and accompanying text. 
208 See infra notes 459–462 and accompanying text. 
209 The technosocial continuity theory also tackles the issue of how the plain view doc-
trine would apply in the Internet context as well as the use of undercover surveillance and 
informants in social media contexts. Strandburg, supra note 25, at 664–79. A full examina-
tion of this theory, however, is beyond the scope of this Article. For my purposes, it is 
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C. Facebook Privacy Policies 
 The Fourth Amendment simply represents the minimum protec-
tion afforded to communications over social networking sites.210 There 
are other nonconstitutional mechanisms available—such as privacy 
policies or congressional legislation—that may provide additional pro-
tection.211 Facebook, like most interactive websites, has extensive pri-
vacy policies intended to ensure protection of a user’s content.212 
 The relevant portion of Facebook’s privacy policies states that a 
user’s “privacy is very important” and that the company shares informa-
tion only in limited circumstances.213 These circumstances include 
where the company has received permission from the user, where the 
user has been given notice (such as in the privacy policies), and where 
the user’s name and personal information have been removed.214 
These circumstances appear relatively restrictive—anonymous disclo-
sures or substantive disclosure only by notice—but by referencing its 
other privacy policies, Facebook retains significant discretion in releas-
ing information to third parties.215 The most pertinent part of Face-
book’s privacy policies relates to sharing information with government 
authorities. Facebook’s policies state that it may: 
access, preserve and share your information in response to a 
legal request (like a search warrant, court order or subpoena) 
if we have a good faith belief that the law requires us to do so. 
                                                                                                                      
enough to say that there are some scholars who favor wholesale rejection of the Third 
Party Doctrine as it applies to these sites. See Henderson, supra note 136, at 39–40; Strand-
burg, supra note 25, at 634–41, 654–64. 
210 See infra notes 211–262 and accompanying text. 
211 See infra notes 211–262 and accompanying text. 
212 Data Use Policy, supra note 120 (describing the privacy policies for Facebook); State-
ment of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 120 (describing the terms of use for Facebook); 
see Privacy Policy, Google, supra note 117 (describing the privacy policies for Google); Pri-
vacy Policy, Myspace, http://www.myspace.com/Help/Privacy (last revised Dec. 17, 2012) 
(describing the privacy policies for Myspace); see also Semitsu, supra note 62, at 302–18 
(discussing the privacy policies of Facebook and other social networking sites). 
213 Data Use Policy, supra note 120 (outlining the circumstances under which Facebook 
can reveal users’ information); Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 120 (“Your 
privacy is very important to us. We designed our Data Use Policy to make important disclo-
sures about how you can use Facebook to share with others and how we collect and can use 
your content and information.”). 
214 Data Use Policy: Information We Receive and How It Is Used, supra note 120. When it 
comes to advertisers, the policy explicitly states that information is disclosed only after a 
user’s name or any other personally identifying information is removed. Data Use Policy: 
How Advertising and Sponsored Stories Work, supra note 120. 
215 See Semitsu, supra note 62, at 305–06. 
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This may include responding to legal requests from jurisdic-
tions outside of the United States where we have a good faith 
belief that the response is required by law in that jurisdiction, 
affects users in that jurisdiction, and is consistent with interna-
tionally recognized standards.216 
The language seems overly inclusive and could potentially allow disclo-
sure based on requests short of warrants, including requests from in-
ternational law enforcement authorities.217 
 But even if this is an unfair characterization, the final paragraph 
and its catchall language eviscerates any supposed protections offered 
by the preceding paragraph.218 The relevant language states that Face-
book may also share information when necessary to “prevent fraud or 
other illegal activity” and may be accessed for “investigations concern-
ing possible violations of our terms or policies.”219 The Statement of 
Rights and Responsibilities details a wide range of proscriptions, includ-
ing not posting anything hateful, threatening, pornographic, contain-
ing nudity, or gratuitous violence, or using Facebook to do anything 
misleading, malicious, or discriminatory.220 Although, as a whole, these 
prohibitions may certainly benefit users, the sweeping language gives 
Facebook wide latitude in disclosing a person’s information.221 
 These policies, however, only bind Facebook.222 Facebook remains 
free—at any point—to modify these policies and to provide even less 
privacy protection.223 And because recent studies show that most users 
are not aware or otherwise do not carefully read these policies, users 
may not realize that their information is potentially more vulnerable to 
disclosure based on evolving Facebook privacy policies.224 Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                      
216 Data Use Policy: Some Other Things You Need to Know, supra note 120. 
217 See Semitsu, supra note 62, at 306. 
218 See id. at 307; Data Use Policy: Some Other Things You Need to Know, supra note 120. 
219 Data Use Policy: Some Other Things You Need to Know, supra note 120. 
220 Statement of Rights and Responsibilities: Safety, supra note 120. 
221 See supra notes 213–220 and accompanying text. Other social networking sites have 
similar privacy policies. Myspace, for example, allows the company to disclose user infor-
mation to protect or defend the company or its employees, protect the safety and security 
of users, protect against fraud or for risk management purposes, or to comply with the law 
or legal process. See Privacy Policy, Myspace, supra note 212; see also Semitsu, supra note 62, 
at 315 (discussing Myspace’s privacy policy). 
222 See James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 1137, 1183 (2009). 
223 Facebook has changed its privacy policies many times in response to complaints 
about inadequate protection. Semitsu, supra note 62, at 302. 
224 See Grimmelmann, supra note 222, at 1181–82 (detailing studies that showed that 
most users never read the privacy policies or did not accurately understand what the poli-
cies allowed). 
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these polices would not legally prevent the government from acquiring 
the information without a warrant.225 As at least some courts have held, 
current law would allow the government to acquire this information 
short of a warrant, despite efforts by Facebook to block such requests.226 
 Perhaps most important, though, these self-regulated privacy poli-
cies—assuming they are considered effective—are not synonymous with 
constitutional protection. Under the Third Party Doctrine, loss of 
Fourth Amendment protection occurs as soon as the user exposes the 
information to a third party, in this case Facebook servers.227 It would 
not make a difference, then, if Facebook, without any notice, suddenly 
changed its policies to the detriment of its users.228 All that matters— 
from a constitutional perspective—is that a user knowingly exposed the 
information to Facebook, even if on the (erroneous) assumption that 
“it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in 
the third party will not be betrayed.”229 
D. Congressional Legislation 
 Congressional legislation provides another, perhaps more robust, 
way to protect communications over social networking sites.230 The Elec-
tronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) attempts to provide 
a comprehensive scheme that goes beyond Fourth Amendment protec-
tion to restrict unauthorized government surveillance of electronic 
                                                                                                                      
225 See infra notes 230–262 and accompanying text. 
226 See, e.g., Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 113–15 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(holding that the Wiretap Act and the SCA do not protect e-mail communications stored 
on servers);United States v. Weaver, 363 F. Supp. 2d 769, 773 (C.D. Ill. 2009) (holding that 
previously read e-mails do not constitute electronic storage under the Stored Communica-
tions Act (SCA)); see also infra notes 230–262 and accompanying text. 
227 See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984) (holding that a government 
agent’s search following a search by a private carrier did not constitute a search within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment); supra notes 114–129 and accompanying text. 
228 There would be no constitutional violation here because a private party, not the 
government, would be breaching its agreement. See, e.g., NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 
191 (1988) (“As a general matter the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment do not 
extend to ‘private conduct abridging individual rights.’” (quoting Burton v. Wilmington 
Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961))). 
229 Miller, 425 U.S. at 442; see also Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 117 (“It is well settled that when 
an individual reveals private information to another, he assumes the risk that his confidant 
will reveal that information to the authorities, and if that occurs the Fourth Amendment 
does not prohibit governmental use of that information.”); Semitsu, supra note 62, at 349 
(“If Facebook or its employees were to voluntarily provide a user’s personal information to 
government investigators, the Fourth Amendment would not clearly prevent or exclude 
such evidence under the [Third Party Doctrine].”). 
230 See infra notes 231–262 and accompanying text. 
32 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:1 
communications.231 Three relevant parts of the ECPA potentially apply 
to Facebook communications: (1) the Wiretap Act;232 (2) the Stored 
Communications Act (SCA);233 and (3) the Pen Register Act (PRA).234 
 The Wiretap Act prohibits federal law enforcement from intercept-
ing wire and electronic communications, unless it has probable cause 
and a warrant signed by a judge.235 Facebook communications would 
seem to fall under the Wiretap Act as they constitute electronic com-
munications. Another part of the Wiretap Act, however, defines “inter-
cept” as the contemporaneous “acquisition of the contents of any” elec-
tronic transmission.236 This would mean that most Facebook communi-
cations are not protected because the social networking site is designed 
to be a storage site for communications, rather than a mechanism for 
simultaneous conversations.237 Courts facing this issue have concluded 
that, for this reason, the Wiretap Act does not cover Facebook commu-
nications.238 
 The SCA was explicitly designed to address various Internet com-
munications that were not necessarily protected by the Fourth 
Amendment.239 The Act seeks to prevent the government from access-
                                                                                                                      
231 See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522, 2701–2711, 3117, 3121–3127 (2006)). 
232 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522. 
233 Id. §§ 2701–2711. 
234 Id. §§ 1321–1327. The following discussion of the ECPA, its three relevant parts, 
and its resulting shortcomings primarily summarizes another scholar’s more complete 
analysis. See Semitsu, supra note 62, at 352–66. 
235 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522. The statute originally covered only wire and oral com-
munications, but it was subsequently amended to include “electronic communications.” See 
id. § 2511(1); Semitsu, supra note 62, at 353. 
236 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4). Even though the section does not explicitly require contem-
poraneous interception of communication with their transmission, the other relevant stat-
utes, together with the context in which the Wiretap Act was passed (recording two-way 
conversations), suggests this interpretation. See Semitsu, supra note 62, at 355; infra notes 
239–259 and accompanying text. 
237 See Semitsu, supra note 62, at 355. This would exclude, of course, instant messaging 
on Facebook. 
238 Cf. Fraser, 352 F.3d at 113–14 (holding that the Wiretap Act does not cover e-mail 
communications stored on servers); Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 
457, 460–62 (5th Cir. 1994) (same); see also Semitsu, supra note 62, at 355 & n.240 (collect-
ing cases). But see United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 79–80 (1st Cir. 2005) (suggest-
ing that contemporaneous interception is not required and that e-mail messages can be 
intercepted after they are stored). 
239 Quon, 529 F.3d at 900 (“The SCA was enacted because the advent of the Internet 
presented a host of potential privacy breaches that the Fourth Amendment does not ad-
dress.); see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711 (2006); Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Commu-
nications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1208, 1209–13 
(2004) (explaining why the SCA exists). 
2013] Social Networking, Interpersonal Privacy, & the Third Party Doctrine 33 
ing electronically stored content, which would include acquiring com-
munications stored on Facebook servers.240 Yet there are important 
exceptions, governed by the length of time the information has been 
stored.241 Communications in “electronic storage” for 180 days or less 
have the greatest protection and require a search warrant supported by 
probable cause.242 Communications stored for greater than 180 days, 
however, only require a trial subpoena supported by reasonable suspi-
cion, which would allow the government to compel Facebook for these 
records.243 Facebook communications stored for longer periods thus 
do not have the kind of protection Congress arguably intended when it 
enacted the SCA.244 
 But communications stored for less than 180 days may also not re-
ceive sufficient protection under the SCA.245 The problem is that “elec-
tronic storage” is not clearly defined under the relevant provision and 
may exclude previously read communications.246 This is particularly 
significant because most Facebook communications—including e-
mails, photos, or posts—will presumably be read or viewed prior to 180 
days. Under this interpretation, then, most Facebook communications 
will not receive SCA protection. Courts are divided on how to interpret 
the relevant statutory language.247 Some interpret “electronic storage” 
                                                                                                                      
240 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711. 
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242 Id. § 2703(a). 
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with such order otherwise would cause an undue burden on such provider. 
Id. § 2703(d); see also Semitsu, supra note 62, at 360 (noting that under § 2703(d) the gov-
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“probable cause” requirement, and that § 2703(d) “allows the government to compel 
Facebook to disclose all content specific to named individuals with a subpoena, without 
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244 Semitsu, supra note 62, at 360–61. 
245 Id. 
246 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510, 2711 (2006). 
247 Compare Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075–77 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding 
that the SCA does protect e-mails stored on a server), with Fraser, 352 F.3d at 114–15 (hold-
ing that the SCA does not protect e-mails stored on a server). 
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narrowly, refusing to extend protection to these Internet communica-
tions.248 Others, however, interpret the term broadly, extending protec-
tion to previously read Internet communications.249 
 Perhaps most troubling, the SCA explicitly states that damages are 
the only remedy available when the government obtains information 
from the ISP in violation of the statute.250 This means that even if the 
government violates the procedures, the statute does not bar the ad-
mission of the communication as evidence in a criminal trial.251 
 The last provision of the ECPA that could provide protection to 
communications such as those on Facebook is the PRA, which requires 
the government to seek a court order before installing an electronic 
device to record incoming address information.252 Its constitutionality 
stems from Smith;253 however, the statute provides a bit more protection 
than the Fourth Amendment.254 As previously discussed, an individual 
has no expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he or she dials, 
and the government is free to acquire this information without a war-
rant.255 But now, the PRA requires the government to at least certify 
that the information is likely to be relevant for an ongoing investigation 
before installing a pen register device.256 The statute also applies to cer-
tain Internet communications, specifically the “to” and “from” fields of 
                                                                                                                      
248 See, e.g., Fraser, 352 F.3d at 114–15; Weaver, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 773; Flagg v. City of 
Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 359 (E.D. Mich. 2008). 
249 See, e.g., Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1075–77; In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to AOL, LLC, 550 
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254 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–3127; Semitsu, supra note 62, at 634. 
255 Smith, 442 U.S. at 744–46. 
256 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2). This standard is lower than probable cause and perhaps 
lower than reasonable suspicion because the government does not have to provide any 
specific facts. Semitsu, supra note 62, at 364–65. 
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an e-mail communication.257 The PRA, however, does not authorize the 
collection of the content of an e-mail.258 This is because the govern-
ment’s ability to access electronically stored content, such as e-mails, is 
governed by the SCA.259 
 In sum, the ECPA does not appear to provide comprehensive pro-
tections for social networking communications, particularly when one 
considers that most stored communications are read within 180 days.260 
Put in perspective, though, the current drawbacks of the ECPA are not 
the real issue. To the extent they do not effectively cover all social net-
working communications, nor provide adequate protection for these 
communications, Congress is free to amend the relevant provisions. 
Congress has the power, for example, to pass legislation that creates 
uniform warrant requirements for all stored information (regardless of 
the storage time or nature of communication), and to provide exclu-
sionary remedies for any resulting violation.261 
 The bigger issue is the constitutional one. These legislative meas-
ures—both present and any future amendments—are not mandated by 
the Fourth Amendment. As discussed earlier, the Third Party Doctrine 
vitiates any reasonable expectation of privacy.262 Facebook users thus 
are at the mercy of legislatures and their discretion to implement 
stricter privacy laws that would prevent the government from acquiring 
information from Facebook without probable cause. To avoid this pre-
dicament, one would have to argue that these communications are still 
somehow deserving of constitutional protection—protection that could 
mandate remedial legislative action. This Article takes a step in that di-
rection by providing an argument focused on interpersonal privacy that 
                                                                                                                      
257 Semitsu, supra note 62, at 365; see In re Application of the United States, 416 F. 
Supp. 2d 13, 17 (D.D.C. 2006). The scope of the Act tracks the content/non-content dis-
tinction discussed earlier. See supra notes 165–181 and accompanying text. 
258 E.g., In re Application of the United States, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 17 (noting that Section 
3121(c) requires that the devices do not gain access to the content of e-mails). Indeed, 
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Application of the United States, 622 F. Supp. 2d 411, 422 (S.D. Tex. 2007); see In re Appli-
cation of the United States, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 17–18. 
259 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711 (2006). 
260 See Tokson, supra note 23, at 591–96 (discussing the weaknesses of the statutory pro-
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262 See supra notes 49–106 and accompanying text. 
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avoids the aforementioned problems associated with a conventional 
application of the Fourth Amendment on the Internet. 
E. The Supreme Court’s Decision in United States v. Jones 
 The Supreme Court’s most recent decision on the Fourth Amend-
ment and technology underscores the problems with the Third Party 
Doctrine and may shed light on its future.263 In its 2012 decision, United 
States v. Jones, the Court found that the government violated the Fourth 
Amendment by placing a GPS tracking device on the defendant’s car 
without a warrant.264 The police thereafter used the device to monitor 
the vehicle—through public streets—for a four-week period, collecting 
thousands of pages of data.265 This information ultimately led to the 
defendant’s conviction.266 
 Writing for the majority, Justice Antonin Scalia concluded that the 
warrantless installation of this device on the car was essentially a tres-
pass on the defendant’s property, constituting a clear violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.267 The Court cited to historical precedent of peo-
ple being secure in their “persons, houses, paper, and effects” from un-
reasonable searches.268 The Court went on to note that although Katz 
changed the test for applying Fourth Amendment protection, it in no 
way repudiated this basic principle.269 The majority, however, did not 
address the broader issue of the Third Party Doctrine, and whether the 
four-week monitoring of the vehicle through public thoroughfares con-
stituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.270 
 Interestingly, Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Samuel Alito, in their 
respective concurrences, raised doubts about the Third Party Doctrine 
as applied to this type of electronic surveillance.271 Justice Sotomayor 
began by recognizing that “GPS monitoring generates a precise, com-
prehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth 
                                                                                                                      
263 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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265 Id. at 948. 
266 Id. at 948–49. 
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269 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950–52. 
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of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual 
associations.”272 She explained that the attributes of such surveillance 
should be taken into account when considering whether a person has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the sum of his or her public 
movements.273 Justice Alito similarly took issue with the long-term 
tracking of the defendant and found that these actions did violate the 
Fourth Amendment.274 
 Currently, of course, individual GPS disclosures, standing alone, do 
not receive Fourth Amendment protection because the driver voluntar-
ily discloses his or her position to the public.275 Voluntary disclosure viti-
ates any reasonable expectation of privacy.276 As Justice Sotomayor ex-
plained, these movements would “attain constitutionally protected status 
only if our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy as a 
prerequisite for privacy.”277 She speculated whether the Court should 
therefore reconsider—in light of today’s technological advancements— 
the viability of the Third Party Doctrine.278 She stated: 
This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people 
reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third 
parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks. People 
disclose the phone numbers that they dial or text to their cel-
lular providers; the URLs that they visit and the e-mail ad-
dresses with which they correspond to their Internet service 
providers; and the books, groceries, and medications they 
purchase to online retailers.279 
 Justice Sotomayor’s point is well-taken. Today’s society involves the 
use of third parties to relay and convey information in an unprece-
dented manner and frequency. Should we deny Fourth Amendment 
                                                                                                                      
272 Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). It is important to note here that the GPS de-
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protection solely on the ground that the information is disclosed to the 
public or to a third party for a limited purpose?280 
 This concern becomes particularly important when it comes to 
communications over social networking sites such as Facebook. Users 
are dependent on the third party servers to facilitate their communica-
tions, but this does not mean that users do not consider the informa-
tion private. The exposure to the server is for the limited purpose of 
assuring that the information reaches the sender. There is no doubt 
that users’ subjective expectations alone do not mandate Fourth 
Amendment protection.281 Still, one must wonder whether technologi-
cal advances in surveillance and communication necessitate a recon-
sideration of the Third Party Doctrine as it presently stands. 
 But any change may have consequences for traditional forms of 
disclosure as it relates to law enforcement. Should disclosing to a gov-
ernment informant certain information for a limited purpose mean 
that the information cannot be used at trial? Most would say “no” and 
current precedent would agree.282 To be sure, any global change in the 
Doctrine would have to address these concerns.283 
III. Interpersonal Privacy Rights 
 Given the questionable viability of and the difficulty with applying 
the Third Party Doctrine to Internet communications, including social 
networking communications, constitutional law dealing with interper-
sonal privacy provides another avenue for protecting those communi-
                                                                                                                      
280 In 2010, in United States v. Maynard, the case appealed to the Court in United States v. 
Jones, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit addressed the issue of public disclo-
sure and privacy in the context of GPS surveillance. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 
544, 549 (D.C. Cir. 2010). It reasoned that under a “mosaic theory,” individual public dis-
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court’s reliance on the mosaic theory in this case raises questions about whether the 
Fourth Amendment analysis for surveillance on public thoroughfares may change if the 
observation is continuous and over longer periods of time. See generally Orin S. Kerr, The 
Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 311 (2012) (examining the merits 
of the mosaic theory). 
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282 See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 117; Miller, 425 U.S. at 443. 
283 This Article does not argue for abolition of the Third Party Doctrine, and thus such 
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cations.284 This Part looks at the interpersonal privacy doctrine and 
how it intersects with Fourth Amendment privacy.285 Section A summa-
rizes the development of the interpersonal privacy doctrine.286 Section 
B then examines the expansion of the interpersonal privacy doc-
trine.287 And, Section C discusses the intersections of and tensions be-
tween privacy under the Fourth Amendment and privacy under due 
process and the First Amendment.288 
A. Early Development of Interpersonal Privacy 
 Unlike the privacy right associated with the Fourth Amendment, 
interpersonal privacy involves protection of interpersonal relationships 
and liberty interests and has its origins in the Due Process Clauses of 
the U.S. Constitution.289 In cases dating back to the mid-twentieth cen-
tury, the U.S. Supreme Court relied on the Due Process Clauses to up-
hold a person’s right to conceive and raise children free from govern-
ment intervention.290 But it was not until 1965, in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, that the Supreme Court first articulated the contours of a 
substantive right to privacy that would ultimately stand apart from the 
privacy associated with the Fourth Amendment.291 
 In Griswold, the Court overturned Connecticut’s ban on the use of 
contraception by married couples.292 The Court found that this law 
trampled on a “zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitu-
tional guarantees.”293 Although grounded in the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court cited to various guarantees in 
the Bill of Rights—including the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments— 
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293 Id. at 485. 
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and their penumbras or emanations that supported the invalidation of 
the government’s prohibition on contraception.294 The Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments, for instance, protect the “‘sanctity of a man’s home 
and the privacies of life,’” whereas the First Amendment protects the 
freedom to associate and privacy in one’s associations.295 Together, these 
rights—even in the absence of a specific constitutional provision ad-
dressing the contraception issue—protect the intimate relations of a 
married couple from this type of unwarranted government intrusion.296 
To hold otherwise, the Court reasoned, would have a “destructive im-
pact upon that relationship.”297 Through other privacy decisions, the 
Court broadened this protection from government intrusion to other 
types of relationships involving unmarried couples using contraception 
and parental decisions relating to childbearing.298 
 The Court’s abortion rights cases further clarified the contours of 
this right and ensconced interpersonal privacy as a permanent fixture 
in American jurisprudence.299 In 1973, in Roe v. Wade, the Supreme 
Court held that this right of privacy was broad enough to cover a 
women’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.300 Rec-
ognizing that the Constitution does not explicitly mention this right, 
the Court concluded that its prior precedent still recognized “a right of 
personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy,” 
with roots in the First and Fifth Amendments.301 
 Similarly, in 1992, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania 
v. Casey, the Supreme Court wrote that “[this privacy right] is a promise 
of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the 
government may not enter.”302 This notion of a person’s liberty 
weighed prominently in the Court’s decision upholding a women’s 
right to choose an abortion.303 The Court defined such choices as in-
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volving “the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in 
a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy.”304 
B. The Expansion of Interpersonal Privacy 
 The abortion right cases focused on individual autonomy and per-
sonal liberty.305 This makes sense as the issue before the Court was a 
woman’s right to make decisions about her body and life free from 
government intrusion. In Lawrence v. Texas, decided in 2003, the Su-
preme Court invalidated a Texas law that criminalized certain sexual 
conduct between two persons of the same sex and expanded interper-
sonal privacy to include liberty rights associated with interpersonal rela-
tionships.306 
 The Court began with a description of the liberty right at stake 
here.307 This right, the Court noted, protects us from “unwarranted 
government intrusions” in our homes and “other spheres of our lives 
and existence.”308 In reaching beyond spatial bounds, the Court rea-
soned that this type of “[l]iberty presumes an autonomy of self that in-
cludes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate 
conduct.”309 Relying on this formulation, the Court found that Texas’ 
sodomy law substantially interfered with, and sought to control, inti-
mate aspects of a couple’s life.310 
 It is important that the Court saw this law as not simply a prohibi-
tion of a specific sexual act.311 According to the Court, this law had “far-
reaching consequences, touching upon the most private human con-
duct, sexual behavior, and in the most private places, the home.”312 In 
other words, the law stood as deleterious to the very existence of the 
same-sex relationship.313 Intimate conduct was an essential element in 
                                                                                                                      
304 Id. at 851. 
305 Id. at 847–53; Roe, 410 U.S. at 152–53. 
306 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). At least one scholar suggests that 
relying on privacy (as the Court did here) to invalidate such laws is not necessary. See gener-
ally Sonu Bedi, Rejecting Rights (2009) (arguing that re-conceptualizing ideas of lim-
ited government sets limitations on the reasons and rationale on which the polity can act). 
Analyzing the sodomy statutes in Lawrence from a framework that prohibits legislative mo-
rality would be sufficient to overturn this type of law. See generally id. 
307 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. 
308 Id. 
309 Id. 
310 Id. at 567, 578. 
311 Id. at 567. 
312 Id. 
313 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 
42 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:1 
the relationship and was thus within the bounds of personal liberty.314 
As the Court stated, “The [sodomy] statutes . . . seek to control a per-
sonal relationship that . . . is within the liberty of persons to choose 
without being punished . . . .”315 In this way, Lawrence did more than just 
protect a person’s right to enter into a relationship of his or her choos-
ing; it also sought to protect those qualities that are intrinsic to the rela-
tionship.316 
 The Court has gone beyond intimate associations and parent-child 
relationships, and has also affirmed the protection of interpersonal re-
lationships in other contexts.317 Focusing on First Amendment and 
equal protection principles, the Court has protected the right of an in-
dividual to define the contours of an association free from government 
intrusion.318 
 In 1984, in Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, for instance, the Supreme Court 
noted that “individuals draw much of their emotional enrichment from 
close ties with others” and found that “[p]rotecting these relationships 
from unwarranted state interference therefore safeguards the ability 
independently to define one’s identity that is central to any concept of 
liberty.”319 In setting the boundaries of this constitutional liberty inter-
est, the Court distinguished between a small group of individuals with 
close ties and a large business enterprise comprised of strangers.320 The 
Court found that liberty was strongest in the former, with whom one 
shares “not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and be-
liefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one’s life.”321 This was con-
trasted with business associations, which do not share the same level of 
“deep attachment and commitments,” nor have the same type of “selec-
tivity” or “seclusion” found in more personal relationships.322 For this 
reason, the Court concluded that U.S. Jaycees, a large, nonselective or-
ganization composed largely of strangers, could not exclude women 
from membership because this exclusion did not further any expressive 
association of the group.323 
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 Yet, in 2000, in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the Supreme Court did 
allow the Boy Scouts—a private organization—to discriminate and ex-
clude homosexuals.324 Unlike the organization in U.S. Jaycees, where 
exclusion of women would not advance any expressive quality of the 
organization, here the Court focused on the expressive nature of the 
organization and found that not allowing the group to exclude homo-
sexuals would adversely impact the group’s identity.325 The Court cited 
to the Boy Scout Oath and the organization’s goal of instilling certain 
values in its young members.326 In this case, the Court determined that 
a heteronormative ideal was part and parcel of the Boy Scout’s iden-
tity.327 The organization thus was free to express this element without 
government intrusion, even if it meant discriminating against a certain 
group.328 
 To be sure, taken separately and narrowly, Lawrence, on the one 
hand, and Dale and U.S. Jaycees, on the other, seem to embody different 
doctrinal constitutional principles—the former specifically protects in-
timate conduct under due process, whereas the latter protects expres-
sive elements of a relationship under First Amendment and equal pro-
tection principles. But, collectively, these cases embody a similar under-
lying rationale of protecting the essential qualities of relationships and 
the autonomy to define them free from government intrusion. It is this 
overarching value of interpersonal relationships, and the expressive 
quality associated with them, that underscores my analysis. 
 One scholar makes a compelling argument for this general conclu-
sion.329 Drawing from these three cases, he argues that the Court is in-
terested in protecting the sanctity of the relationship and the autonomy 
to define it.330 These values stand as the basic principles of the interper-
sonal privacy right.331 As he argues, “autonomy, intimacy, and dignity 
                                                                                                                      
324 Dale, 530 U.S. at 644, 659. 
325 Id. at 656–59. The dissent recognized that certain associations, including law firms, 
schools, and labor organizations, could not practice such discrimination. Id. at 678–79 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent looked to U.S. Jaycees to suggest that such organiza-
tions would not have an expressive association that necessitated discrimination. Id. at 679–
80 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 612–13, 615, 623–27). See generally 
Sonu Bedi, Expressive Exclusion: A Defense, 7 J. Moral Phil. 427 (2010) (discussing cases in 
which the Court found a liberty interest based on expressive association under the First 
Amendment). 
326 Dale, 530 U.S. at 649. 
327 See id. at 659; Crocker, supra note 28, at 20–21. 
328 Dale, 530 U.S. at 659. 
329 See Crocker, supra note 28, at 22–32. 
330 See id. 
331 Id. at 22. 
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are all also interpersonal values protected under due process.”332 
Autonomy in this context is somewhat self-explanatory: individuals have 
the ability to choose with whom they associate and what they decide to 
do in that relationship.333 These relationships—whether sexual or 
membership-oriented—also vary in degree of intimacy.334 Individuals 
share experiences, emotions, thoughts, and information.335 Protecting 
these interpersonal relationships also simultaneously guarantees a per-
son’s dignity.336 Who a person is and what she thinks of herself is inex-
tricably connected with the relationships into which she enters. 
C. The Intersection of Privacy Interests: The Fourth Amendment Versus Due 
Process and the First Amendment 
 The two aforementioned notions of privacy—interpersonal privacy 
under due process and First Amendment principles and privacy under 
the Fourth Amendment—seek to protect two different interests.337 The 
former protects interpersonal autonomy whereas the latter focuses on a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.338 Both can still be seen as protecting 
against intrusions by the government. Still, only a few scholars have in-
troduced interpersonal privacy into the larger discussion of third party 
disclosure, a topic typically reserved for Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence.339 
                                                                                                                      
 
332 Id. at 22; see also John D. Inazu, Liberty’s Refuge: The Forgotten Freedom of 
Assembly 4 (2012) (discussing the history of the right of assembly and noting that this 
right protects “a group’s autonomy, composition, and existence”); Jamal Greene, Beyond 
Lawrence: Metaprivacy and Punishment, 115 Yale L.J. 1862, 1875 (2006) (arguing that the 
Court in Lawrence protects “metaprivacy,” that is, “the right to engage in status-definitional 
conduct free from normalizing governmental interference”). 
333 Crocker, supra note 28, at 23–25. 
334 Id. at 25–27. 
335 Id. at 25–26. 
336 Id. at 28–32; see also Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 Geo. L.J. 2087, 2092 
(2001) (“To equate privacy with dignity is to ground privacy in social forms of respect that 
we owe each other as members of a common community.”). 
337 Compare supra notes 289–336 and accompanying text (discussing privacy under the 
Due Process Clauses and the First Amendment), with supra notes 49–106 and accompany-
ing text (discussing privacy under the Fourth Amendment). 
338 See supra note 337. 
339 Neil M. Richards, The Information Privacy Law Project, 94 Geo. L.J. 1087, 1118–19 
(2006) (noting that interpersonal or expressive privacy considerations may be helpful in 
working through the disclosure issues with the Third Party Doctrine); see also Penney, supra 
note 28, at 236–37, 240–42 (discussing the importance of interpersonal privacy in virtual 
space as a means of self-expression). Scholars have raised First Amendment and right to 
association issues in the context of government surveillance on the Internet. See, e.g., 
Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World: First Amendment Regula-
tion of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. Rev. 741, 794–812 (2008); Peter Swire, Social Net-
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 Thomas Crocker provides a comprehensive analysis of how inter-
personal privacy meshes with the Third Party Doctrine.340 He finds that 
these two concepts are ultimately at odds with one another.341 He ar-
gues that the narrow conception of privacy as secrecy under the Fourth 
Amendment fails fully to recognize the value of interpersonal relation-
ships guaranteed under the Due Process Clauses.342 
 Crocker begins by explaining the implications of the Third Party 
Doctrine and the risks we undertake when we communicate with oth-
ers: 
Whenever we communicate with others through speech or 
writing, they may repeat our words, thoughts, and meanings 
in contexts and to others in ways we may neither intend nor 
desire. More particularly, we assume the risk that in sharing, 
other persons will take our words to have legal significance— 
as evidence of criminal wrongdoing or political dangerous-
ness—and repeat them to an officer of the State.343 
Whenever people communicate with another person, they assume the 
risk that this person may reveal the information to the government.344 
Crocker recognizes that it does not matter that a person may limit what 
he or she wants the other person to do after receiving the communica-
tion.345 That person has no control over what the other person may do 
with the information or to whom the other person reveals it.346 In fact, 
this principle is central to the role of a confidential informant. This is 
                                                                                                                      
works, Privacy, and Freedom of Association: Data Protection vs. Data Empowerment, 90 N.C. L. 
Rev. 1371, 1383–96 (2012). These scholars have argued that the First Amendment should 
apply when considering the permissibility of government surveillance of online communi-
cations (e.g., data mining). See, e.g., Strandburg, supra, at 794–95; Swire, supra, at 1383–96. 
These scholars also focus on an individual’s right of association under the First Amend-
ment, and how government surveillance may adversely impact this right. See, e.g., Strand-
burg, supra, at 801–04; Swire, supra, at 1395–96. 
My aim is qualitatively different. This Article focuses on relationship formation over the 
Internet and how the concept of interpersonal privacy (embodied by both First Amendment 
and due process principles) provides a Fourth Amendment justification for why the Third 
Party Doctrine should not apply to Facebook relationships and their constituent communica-
tions. 
340 Crocker, supra note 28, at 32–48. 
341 Id. at 46–48. 
342 See id. 
343 Id. at 33. 
344 Id. 
345 Id. 
346 Crocker, supra note 28, at 33; see, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 
(1984); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). 
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someone who, by design, gains an individual’s trust (perhaps by decep-
tion) with the intention of gathering pertinent communication from 
the target and revealing it to the government.347 As previously dis-
cussed, the Fourth Amendment would provide no protection to the 
communication that was disclosed to the government informant.348 
 Crocker goes on to argue that this risk of disclosure under the 
Third Party Doctrine to an undercover agent undermines the princi-
ples behind interpersonal privacy rights.349 How can the government 
protect a liberty interest as it pertains to interpersonal relationships 
when communications in these relationships are not guaranteed to be 
private? In making this point, Crocker focuses on the connection be-
tween the individual liberty interest and relationships.350 He argues: 
[S]ocial practices are more accurately understood as particu-
lar ways of obtaining personal fulfillment through shared so-
cial life that produce particular conceptions of privacy. Pri-
vacy’s role in ordinary social practice is fluid and relational. 
No doubt, privacy sometimes means undisclosed, but not al-
ways. If we recognize how our lives are shaped through social 
practices of sharing, it is odd to equate the fact that “our ob-
servable actions and possessions are private at the discretion 
of those around us” with an actual fact of publicity . . . .351 
 Take again the scenario from Lawrence. The rationale for invalidat-
ing a sodomy law was the importance of this interpersonal relationship 
and the autonomy interest associated with it.352 In short, this was a per-
sonal relationship where the government had no business to inter-
                                                                                                                      
347 See On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 750–53 (1952). 
348 See supra notes 49–106 and accompanying text. In United States v. White, Justice William 
O. Douglas provided an impassioned dissent on this issue. 401 U.S. 745, 756–68 (1971) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting). He found that the monitoring of conversations by an informant 
“kills free discourse and spontaneous utterances.” Id. at 762. He recognized that the “individ-
ual must keep some facts concerning his thoughts within a small zone of people.” Id. at 763. 
Yet, Justice Douglas observed that: 
[a]t the same time he must be free to pour out his woes or inspirations or 
dreams to others. He remains the sole judge as to what must be said and what 
must remain unspoken. This is the essence of the idea of privacy implicit in 
the First and Fifth Amendments as well as in the Fourth. 
Id. 
349 Crocker, supra note 28, at 47–48. 
350 Id. 
351 Id. at 47 (citing Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 133 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., dis-
senting). 
352 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 
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vene.353 On these facts, it also stands to reason that one individual 
would not want communications to his or her partner to be disclosed 
outside the relationship. Indeed, privacy of communications would 
seem to be part and parcel of the relationship. As Crocker states, “It is 
evident then that our form of life is constituted through acts of sharing 
with particular others—intimate partners, family members, friends, or 
associates—which we do not intend or expect to become acts of sharing 
with the world at large.”354 Yet, it would not be unconstitutional for a 
governmental informant to pose as one of these individuals, in an ef-
fort to elicit incriminating statements, even if these statements were 
made in the confines of a relationship.355 
 Here then stands the opposing normative structure of these two 
constitutional doctrines. One paradigm—embodied through cases like 
Lawrence, Dale, and U.S. Jaycees—values interpersonal relationships. In-
terpersonal privacy seeks to protect interpersonal relationships from 
government intrusion.356 To be sure, the Court’s focus on the value of 
relationships stands as the very reason why the government cannot 
prohibit intimate conduct or restrict the use of contraception.357 The 
other paradigm—one stemming from the Fourth Amendment—works 
against this structure.358 It does not protect communications made by 
an individual to an undercover government agent with whom there is a 
shared relationship.359 By intruding in the relationship, the state cur-
tails a private citizen’s ability to develop his or her identity and to form 
a true interpersonal bond.360 Indeed, the only way to assure nondisclo-
sure to the government is to avoid making the communication.361 This 
means that the Fourth Amendment does not take into account the re-
lational status of the parties in which the communication is made.362 
                                                                                                                      
353 See id. 
354 Crocker, supra note 28, at 53. 
355 See Miller, 425 U.S. at 443. Crocker seems to recognize that not all disclosures made 
to a government informant would occur in the context of a relationship where liberty in-
terests are implicated. See Crocker, supra note 28, at 67 (“When a government informant is 
placed among a mixture of close business associates and friends, the nature of the rela-
tionship becomes less clear. Such informants can become particularly vexing when they 
invade not only close personal relationships, but also when they implicate protected civic 
and political associations. In such cases, courts may have to conduct a more fine-grained 
analysis to determine if liberty interests are implicated . . . .”). 
356 Crocker, supra note 28, at 21. 
357 Id.; see Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485. 
358 Crocker, supra note 28, at 47–48. 
359 See Miller, 425 U.S. at 443; On Lee, 343 U.S. at 750–53. 
360 Crocker, supra note 28 at 51–52. 
361 See Miller, 425 U.S. at 443. 
362 See Crocker, supra note 28, at 47–48, 51–52. 
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 Crocker finds that this problem perhaps is most visible in today’s 
technology-oriented world.363 He mentions the prevalence of cell 
phones and the government’s ability to monitor such devices and to 
track a person’s location.364 He also references social networking sites, 
such as Facebook, and the government’s ability to monitor these web-
sites using an alias.365 Presumably, the point here is that although none 
of these communications is protected by the Fourth Amendment under 
the Third Party Doctrine, each facilitates the development of interper-
sonal relationships—the very type of conduct protected by due process 
and First Amendment principles. 
 Crocker concludes his argument by discussing ways that interper-
sonal privacy considerations can be incorporated into the application 
of Fourth Amendment principles when it comes to this type of gov-
ernment intrusion.366 He proposes, for instance, that authorities 
should first gather the consent of all parties or otherwise seek a warrant 
in order to acquire the relevant communication within a personal rela-
tionship.367 
 Crocker’s overall point is valid. There does appear to be some ten-
sion between interpersonal privacy and the privacy guaranteed under 
the Fourth Amendment as it pertains to government intrusion. On the 
one hand, interpersonal privacy seeks to protect and encourage inter-
personal bonds. On the other, the Fourth Amendment allows the gov-
ernment to infiltrate these bonds to gather information. 
 That said, in another important way, these privacy rights protect 
different things. The Fourth Amendment—as it relates to third party 
disclosure—primarily regulates communications, whereas interpersonal 
                                                                                                                      
363 Id. at 53–56. 
364 Id. at 54. 
365 Id. at 53–54. Crocker seems to have in mind the government’s ability to pose as a 
Facebook friend and thereby to monitor an individual’s posts. See id. The Fourth Amend-
ment would not protect information disclosed to this “friend.” See Semitsu, supra note 62, 
at 320–21 (describing a case in which the FBI contacted a suspect’s Facebook friend in 
order to learn information about the suspect’s Facebook postings, and ultimately secured 
an arrest without resorting to a warrant or a subpoena). The Fourth Amendment would 
also not protect one Facebook friend forwarding information to a government agent. Id. 
at 344–46. But, because of the Third Party Doctrine, these messages would already not 
qualify for Fourth Amendment protection given that these messages are stored privately. 
See supra notes 114–129 and accompanying text. 
366 Crocker, supra note 28, at 62–68. 
367 Id. at 66–68. Crocker makes allowances for exigent circumstances, where a warrant 
would not be feasible. See id. at 67 (noting that under the proposed framework, the gov-
ernment cannot enter into protected interpersonal relationships without a warrant, unless 
it has consent or satisfies an established exception to the warrant requirement); supra note 
54 (summarizing the warrant exceptions). 
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privacy focuses on essential elements of interpersonal relationships.368 
Under interpersonal privacy, the government cannot prohibit a person 
or small group’s ability to define its relationship the way it sees fit be-
cause these choices strike at the heart of a relationship.369 Not protect-
ing communications made to a government informant would certainly 
seem to deter individuals from forming these relationships for fear that 
agents may be posing as prospective intimates.370 But this lack of pro-
tection for communications—and any resulting deterrence—does not 
appear endemic to the relationship. In other words, the government is 
not interfering with any essential aspect of the relationship. Individuals 
are free to form relationships with whomever they choose. Invoking 
interpersonal privacy thus does not alter the Fourth Amendment rea-
sonable expectation calculus. 
 One might argue that by not protecting communications, the gov-
ernment is effectively restricting a person’s ability to trust another per-
son.371 Although most would agree that trust is an essential part of any 
relationship, it does not follow that the government is interfering with 
this element of a relationship when it seizes the communication without 
probable cause or a warrant. To be sure, a person may betray another’s 
trust, even if they are not working as an informant or otherwise affili-
ated with the government. Indeed, to restrict a person’s ability to do so 
would interfere with the recipient’s autonomy or liberty.372 A person 
thus always assumes the risk that the other person may reveal secrets to 
somebody else.373 The insertion of the government here does not sub-
                                                                                                                      
 
368 Compare supra notes 76–106 and accompanying text (discussing the Third Party 
Doctrine), with supra notes 289–336 and accompanying text (discussing interpersonal pri-
vacy rights). The Fourth Amendment’s reasonable expectation of privacy test also protects 
tangible objects such as papers and effects. See Miller, 425 U.S. at 441–43 (holding that 
there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in checks and deposit slips). 
369 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567; Dale, 530 U.S. at 656; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485. 
370 For this reason, some scholars have suggested a more relational account of the Fourth 
Amendment that would protect these statements under the reasonable expectation of privacy 
test. E.g., Mary I. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the Rights of Relationships, 
75 Calif. L. Rev. 1593, 1651–58 (1987). The Court, of course, has not adopted such an ap-
proach. See supra notes 49–106 and accompanying text. 
371 Crocker seems to make this point. See Crocker, supra note 28, at 52 (“[W]ith inter-
personal relations, each person is reciprocally vulnerable to the other. This condition does 
not exist when the State occupies the position of the other. . . . [There,] the State attempts 
to control the conditions of an otherwise intimate or associational interaction, with its 
power to participate as the non-reciprocal other.”). 
372 This would most likely run afoul of basic First Amendment principles. 
373 In fact, even if one argued that the Fourth Amendment should prevent undercover 
agents from gathering and using incriminating communications from potential suspects, 
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stantially alter this risk calculus—the risk of betrayal is inherent in any 
relationship.374 In other words, although individuals  may be deterred 
from entering such relationships for fear that the government is playing 
the role on the other side of the relationship, the government’s ability 
to pose as the person in the relationship does not prohibit or otherwise 
restrict an essential part of it.375 
 Still, the concept of interpersonal privacy does have particular 
relevance to social networking on the Internet and the issue of third 
party disclosure. A more nuanced argument, though, is necessary—one 
that focuses on the relationship between Facebook users created by 
these communications and the role (or lack of it) that ISPs play in this 
relationship creation. 
IV. Facebook Relationships and Interpersonal Privacy Rights 
 This Part argues that given the nature of relationships created 
through social networking sites, the interpersonal privacy doctrine pro-
vides a mechanism for protecting those communications.376 This Part 
uses Facebook as an example of how social networking communica-
tions would work under the interpersonal privacy doctrine.377 Section A 
discusses how online relationships through Facebook mimic face-to-
face relationships.378 Section B applies interpersonal privacy principles 
to Facebook communications and considers under what circumstances 
these communications are most likely to be protected.379 Section C ana-
lyzes whether social networking communications would be covered un-
                                                                                                                      
this relational account would still not prevent a citizen unaffiliated with the government 
from disclosing voluntarily what was learned to government authorities. 
374 See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Semitsu, supra note 62, at 330–
31 (“Under [the misplaced trust doctrine], a person who mistakenly places her trust in 
someone who turns out to be an informant or government agent does not maintain any 
privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment.”). 
375 A similar difficulty befalls those scholars who argue for First Amendment protec-
tion and the right of association as a check on government surveillance of Internet com-
munications. See Strandburg, supra note 339, at 795–812; Swire, supra note 339, at 1383–96. 
The potential chilling effect of undercover government informants would seem to apply to 
both online and conventional face-to-face relationships. This focus on First Amendment 
protection would militate in favor of protecting these statements, which the Court has not 
done. See supra notes 49–106 and accompanying text. This Article does not support such a 
drastic conclusion, and indeed maintains that the Third Party Doctrine remains an impor-
tant feature of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and an essential law enforcement tool, 
both online and offline. 
376 See infra notes 382–488 and accompanying text. 
377 See infra notes 382–488 and accompanying text. 
378 See infra notes 382–423 and accompanying text. 
379 See infra notes 424–470 and accompanying text. 
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der the reasonable expectation of privacy test given their intersection 
with interpersonal privacy.380 And, finally, Section D provides a hypo-
thetical to illustrate how (and which) Facebook communications would 
be protected.381 
A. The Nature of Facebook Relationships 
 As previously mentioned, Facebook allows users to send e-mails, 
post photos and status updates, and send instant messages, among 
other things.382 Facebook recently added video conferencing to its list 
of features.383 All profiles now also follow a timeline-based format, 
which chronologically details each user’s history on the site, including 
the user’s prior posts, photographs, places the user has been, and other 
content.384 
 A simple accounting of these various features, however, belies the 
true impact and reach of Facebook. Facebook has revolutionized the 
way individuals communicate and develop social relationships.385 It is 
no surprise that over one billion users across the world are members of 
the site, requiring a continuous increase in storage facilities to accom-
modate the massive amounts of information being transmitted over the 
Internet.386 
 Social scientists and legal scholars alike have recognized this new 
form of communication and analyzed its social implications.387 As one 
                                                                                                                      
 
380 See infra notes 471–479 and accompanying text. 
381 See infra notes 480–488 and accompanying text. 
382 See supra notes 118–121 and accompanying text. 
383 See Video Calling: Basics & Privacy, supra note 119. 
384 See Get Started: Introducing Timeline, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/help/ 
467610326601639/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2012). 
385 See generally Hope Bareham, The Creation and Maintenance of Relationships with Social 
Networking Sites: How Facebook Has Recreated the Way Friendships Are Formed, Digital Literacies 
Blog (Apr. 25, 2011), http://digitallithb.wordpress.com/2011/04/25/final-paper-digital-
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386 See Miller, Facebook Makes Big Investment, supra note 120 (discussing the increase of 
Facebook storage facilities); Key Facts, supra note 18 (“One billion monthly active users as 
of October 2012.”). 
387 See, e.g., Bargh & McKenna, supra note 37; Nicole B. Ellison et al., The Benefits of Face-
book “Friends”: Social Capital and College Students’ Use of Online Social Network Sites, 12 J. Com-
puter-Mediated Comm. 1143 (2007); Charles Steinfeld et al., Social Capital, Self-Esteem, and 
Use of Online Social Networking Sites: A Longitudinal Analysis, 29 J. Applied Developmental 
Psychol. 434 (2008); Stephanie Tom Tong et al., Too Much of a Good Thing? The Relationship 
Between Number of Friends and Interpersonal Impressions on Facebook, 13 J. Computer-Mediated 
Comm. 531 (2008); Tom R. Tyler, Is the Internet Changing Social Life? It Seems the More Things 
Change, the More They Stay the Same, 58 J. Soc. Issues 195 (2002); Mihaela Vorvoreanu, Percep-
tions of Corporations on Facebook: An Analysis of Facebook Social Norms, J. New Comm. Res., 
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sociologist writes, “Facebook has created unique and different way[s] 
for [individuals] to develop and maintain friendships via the internet, 
no matter the physical distance.”388 The ability to create new relation-
ships and maintain them probably stands as the most significant func-
tion of this kind of social networking.389 
 Psychologists have found that for some individuals, most notably 
college students, Facebook has replaced physical interactions as a 
means of developing and sustaining relationships.390 In this way, Face-
book has filled an important social need by allowing individuals to ex-
press themselves in ways they may not be able to in face-to-face meet-
ings. Facebook provides a safe environment where “those who are so-
cially anxious and those who are lonely [can] turn . . . as a means of 
forming close and meaningful relationships with others.”391 Indeed, 
one study found that individuals expressed their true selves more freely 
over social networking sites than in face-to-face encounters.392 
 The overall effect is interaction with others on a consistent basis 
without regard to physical presence or distance.393 Critical to this con-
clusion is the corollary finding by psychologists that Facebook relation-
ships can be just as “real” as those relationships that take place in face-
to-face meetings.394 These studies show that Internet relationships on 
Facebook share the same breadth, depth, and quality as those devel-
oped in person.395 
                                                                                                                      
Spring/Summer 2009, at 67; Jessica Vitak, Facebook “Friends:” How Online Identities Impact 
Offline Relationships (Apr. 22, 2008) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Georgetown University), 
available at http://www.academia.edu/412944/Facebook_Friends_How_Online_Identities_ 
Impact_Offline_Relationships; Bareham, supra note 385. 
388 Bareham, supra note 385, at Introduction (“Today, practically everyone has a Face-
book [profile] and interacts daily online forming and creating relationships. It truly has 
become a new way to make friends and meet people. We are so accustomed to meeting 
people and having to develop relationships face to face, but with the Internet it has made 
friendship and social interaction available practically anywhere.”). 
389 Ellison et al., supra note 387, at 1162–63. 
390 Bargh & McKenna, supra note 37, at 580–82; Vitak, supra note 387, at 4–5; Bare-
ham, supra note 385, at Discussion Section. 
391 See Tyler, supra note 387, at 200–01 (citing John A. Bargh et al., Can You See the Real 
Me? Activation and Expression of the “True Self” on the Internet, 58 J. Soc. Issues 33, 44–46 
(2002)). 
392 Bargh et al., supra note 391, at 44–46. 
393 Bareham, supra note 385, at Introduction (“This site has become and [sic] impor-
tant component to these college students[’] lives, and has allowed them to create connec-
tions and share information with those in close proximity to them in college.”). 
394 See Bargh et al., supra note 391, at 44–46; Bargh & McKenna, supra note 37, at 581. 
395 See, e.g., Bargh & McKenna, supra note 37, at 581. 
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 At least one scholar, James Grimmelmann, has also recognized the 
similar qualitative structure of Facebook relationships and their more 
traditional face-to-face counterparts.396 Relying on social and psycho-
logical studies, he cites to three ways Facebook promotes social dynam-
ics and interpersonal values.397 Grimmelmann argues that “Facebook 
provides users with a forum in which they can craft social identities, 
forge reciprocal relationships, and accumulate social capital.”398 
 Social identity—Grimmelmann’s first factor—is how one presents 
oneself to others.399 The basic desire to “convince others to accept your 
claims about yourself” is common to all social interactions.400 Accord-
ing to Grimmelmann, social networking sites like Facebook facilitate 
this need of identity construction by allowing users to create the identi-
ties they want.401 Users have full control over what pictures to post and 
what information to include on their profile. These profiles thus are 
wholly socially constructed—controlled pieces of information for oth-
ers to see. In technical terms, Facebook allows users to communicate 
“prestige, differentiation, authenticity, and theatrical persona using a 
common language.”402 
 Grimmelmann’s second factor focuses on the aforementioned 
ability of Facebook to create and maintain relationships.403 He writes 
that social networks are “a way for users to meet new people” as well as 
“help in the transmission of social cues that facilitate offline transac-
tions.”404 Grimmelmann is quick to point out the unique relationship 
building features of Facebook that set it apart from traditional e-mail 
                                                                                                                      
396 E.g., Grimmelmann, supra note 222, at 1154–56. 
397 Id. at 1151–60. 
398 Id. at 1151. Grimmelmann cites to a number of studies in his article. See, e.g., Erv-
ing Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959); Sherry Turkle, Life 
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403 Id. at 1154–56. 
404 Id. at 1154. 
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systems that merely allow back-and-forth messaging.405 He specifically 
cites to a user’s ability to add someone as a contact—a fundamental act 
that gives someone access to the user’s profile, and thus provides “a 
form of minor intimacy that signals trust.”406 Grimmelmann goes on to 
cite other Facebook features that foster the development of relation-
ships, including the ability to “Poke” someone or to write on another 
user’s wall.407 
 This discussion leads to Grimmelmann’s final point about recip-
rocity. What makes Facebook such a powerful relationship-building tool 
is its ability to encourage users to respond or otherwise engage in a mu-
tual dialogue.408 This is embodied in two features: the wall-to-wall tool, 
which displays the back-and-forth between two users; and the status up-
date tool, which prompts a user to ask “What is on your mind?” and 
also displays recent answers by fellow Facebook friends.409 These tools 
promote a person’s existing and “deeply wired human impulse to re-
ciprocate” and “activate relational impulses.”410 
 The third factor centers on the community building aspect of so-
cial networking sites such as Facebook.411 Grimmelmann makes the 
initial observation that Facebook use begets Facebook use.412 Individu-
als are more likely to sign up for the service if they see their friends 
signing up for it.413 Also, there is the “networked space” of Facebook 
that allows users to recreate a real-life social network in a virtual 
space.414 This structure also provides an inducement for users to ex-
tend their network by “friending” more individuals.415 
                                                                                                                      
405 See Grimmelmann, supra note 222, at 1154–55; see also supra notes 118–121 and ac-
companying text (discussing Facebook’s features). 
406 Grimmelmann, supra note 222, at 1155. 
407 Id. at 1155. 
408 Id. at 1155–56. 
409 Id. 
410 Id. at 1156. 
411 Id. at 1157–60. 
412 See Grimmelmann, supra note 222, at 1157. 
413 Id. 
414 Id. at 1157–58. 
415 Id. at 1158. Grimmelmann discusses the power of adding individuals as Facebook 
friends: 
 This navigational pleasure also provides an inducement to extend your so-
cial horizon. . . . If you add Seth as a contact, all of his contacts are now contacts-
of-contacts of yours—and all of your contacts are now contacts-of-contacts of his. 
Adding connections fills out your social map, giving you a richer view of your 
social context. 
Id. 
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 This sense of community is further enhanced because users are 
allowed to stake out a social position within their network.416 Users, for 
instance, can compete for who has the most contacts, which translates 
into “social currency.”417 More directly, many Facebook applications 
take the form of competitive games.418 Users can post their highest 
scores for all to see and prompt their Facebook friends to compete in 
an attempt to best their performance. This type of competitive spirit 
fosters a community-building environment where individuals—much 
like in the real world—posture for certain positions.419 One Facebook 
application even allows users to place price tags on their friendships.420 
 It is important to note that Grimmelmann’s point is ultimately one 
about human desire.421 These three qualities—identity, relationship, 
and community—are not unique to social networking sites; they are 
“basic elements of social interaction, offline and on.”422 Social network-
ing sites, like Facebook, simply provide a structure under which indi-
viduals can satisfy these impulses in a virtual setting.423 
B. Protecting Facebook Relationships 
 Protecting the sanctity of interpersonal relationships from gov-
ernment intrusion stands at the heart of the cases involving interper-
sonal privacy rights.424 These rights are aimed at constructing a zone of 
privacy where individuals have the freedom to enter relationships and, 
just as importantly, define them the way they see fit. If Facebook rela-
tionships have a similar qualitative structure as face-to-face relation-
ships, it stands to reason that they too should merit privacy protection, 
despite the disclosure to ISPs. The purpose here is simply to put these 
                                                                                                                      
416 Id. at 1158–59. Social scientists have also recognized how Facebook creates and 
maintains an individual’s social capital. See Ellison et al., supra note 387, at 1161–64; 
Steinfeld et al., supra note 387, at 443–44. 
417 Grimmelmann, supra note 222, at 1158 (“[Adding Facebook friends makes] you 
yourself more valuable as a contact, since by connecting to you, others can expand their 
own horizons.”). 
418 Id. 
419 See id. at 1158–59. 
420 Id. 
421 Id. at 1159. 
422 Id. 
423 See Grimmelmann, supra note 222, at 1159. The point of the preceding analysis is 
less about equating the specifics of Facebook relationships with their offline counterparts 
and more about highlighting the similar reactions and feelings individuals experience 
when making either of these associations. 
424 See supra notes 305–336 and accompanying text. 
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Internet relationships on the same footing as face-to-face relationships 
when it comes to Fourth Amendment protection.425 
1. Applying the Concept of Interpersonal Privacy 
 Facebook relationships and their underlying communications pass 
the reasonable expectation of privacy test, despite the disclosure to 
ISPs.426 As previously discussed, the reasonable expectation test is ob-
jective in nature and requires courts to determine whether the particu-
lar communication merits privacy protection from government intru-
sion.427 Before invoking interpersonal privacy, however, an analysis as to 
why, and in what way, the concept of interpersonal privacy applies to 
Facebook relationships and to their underlying communications is re-
quired. 
 In short, both kinds of relationships—those over the Internet and 
those that are face-to-face—foster the same principles of autonomy, 
identity, and community. As one scholar argues, “Lawrence, [U.S. Jay-
cees], and Dale are all cases protecting different kinds of interpersonal 
relationships that are both expressive and identity definitional.”428 This 
description of interpersonal privacy would also squarely include Face-
book relationships. 
 There are, however, key differences. Interpersonal privacy rights 
typically involve face-to-face relationships that occur in a person’s 
home.429 The physical presence requirement is almost a nonstarter. It is 
certainly true that Facebook relationships do not take place in face-to-
face settings, like in a person’s home. But why should that matter, at 
least from a normative point of view? Because a Facebook relationship 
can be entirely online, the communications themselves take on a more 
important role—they alone make up the relationship. So it does not 
make sense to focus on essential physical “acts” when talking about the 
concept of interpersonal privacy in the online context, because rela-
tionships in this medium have no physical “acts” in the conventional 
                                                                                                                      
425 This Article does not argue that these relationships actually merit substantive due 
process or First Amendment protection. The fact that I am not arguing for actual constitu-
tional protection based on due process or First Amendment grounds means Facebook 
relationships do not have to be exactly the same when it comes to the aforementioned 
qualities. It is enough that these relationships share similar structures with their face-to-
face counterparts. 
426 See infra notes 427–470 and accompanying text. 
427 See supra notes 64–73, 129 and accompanying text. 
428 Crocker, supra note 28, at 21. 
429 E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479, 481–86 (1965). 
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sense of the term.430 Indeed, much like the aforementioned Fourth 
Amendment scholarship that seeks to update the Third Party Doctrine 
to the Internet context,431 the point here is to use the concept of inter-
personal privacy to protect communications in this new medium. 
 Focusing on intimate acts alone also does not necessarily assail this 
conclusion. In the first instance, the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. 
Texas, in 2003, although it prohibited Texas’s sodomy law, invoked the 
principles of autonomy and interpersonal relationships in reaching its 
conclusion, and thus it was not simply a case about sex.432 For instance, 
a law against same-sex friendships would also run afoul of Lawrence, 
even though there would be no prohibition against sex.433 
 Second and equally important, because this Article defines inter-
personal privacy broadly, it does not argue that such a term is simply 
reserved for relationships involving intimate conduct. Indeed, the Su-
preme Court, in Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees in 1984 and Boy Scouts of America v. 
Dale in 2000, relied on equal protection and First Amendment princi-
ples to argue for the general ability of individuals and expressive groups 
to define their relationships free from government interference.434 The 
Dale case, for example, involved a group that wanted to self-define its 
membership the way it saw fit.435 The Court recognized this right rely-
ing on interpersonal privacy considerations, even though the relation-
ship did not involve intimate acts of any kind.436 
 The fact that Facebook relationships occur in “cyberspace” should 
also not change the analysis. Assuming this is a public space, there is 
                                                                                                                      
430 One may argue that because of this fact alone, interpersonal privacy a fortiori has no 
role to play in the online context when discussing Fourth Amendment protection. But this 
begs the question of why physical acts alone would be worthy of protection. Presumably, 
the reason is because they alone are essential to the relationship. In the online context, 
however, communications alone are constituent of the relationship, and thus necessarily 
are essential to it. 
431 See supra notes 130–209 and accompanying text. 
432 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573–74; supra notes 306–316 and accompanying text. 
433 This Article also does not seek to apply substantive due process to Facebook commu-
nications, and thus does not need to confine itself to the narrow holding of Lawrence. Fur-
thermore, although Facebook does not allow sexual-based posts or photographs, one can 
imagine a platform in the future that would allow such interactions, which would make the 
narrow holding in Lawrence more readily applicable. See Statement of Rights and Responsibilities: 
Safety, supra note 120 (“You will not post content that: is hate speech, threatening, or porno-
graphic; incites violence; or contains nudity or graphic or gratuitous violence.”). 
434 See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648, 656–59 (2000); Roberts v. U.S. Jay-
cees, 468 U.S. 609, 617–29 (1984); supra notes 305–375 and accompanying text. 
435 Dale, 530 U.S. at 647–61. 
436 See id. 
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precedent under Dale that identity formation in public is protected.437 
But it is not clear that Facebook relationships take place in a public 
arena.438 To be sure, the relationship is not face to face. Yet, this fact 
alone does not automatically mean that the virtual space in which this 
relationship is taking place automatically becomes a public arena or 
public space.439 For one thing, communications over Facebook are pri-
vate insofar as only the intended recipient or an individual’s group of 
friends will see it.440 This is very different from a communication made 
in the open or in a public setting where there would be no such subjec-
tive expectation of privacy.441 Second, there appears to be no concep-
tual reason why Internet—or at least the virtual space in which com-
munications are transmitted—is not better seen as a private space, per-
haps as an extension of a person’s home or office.442 Public or not, 
Facebook relationships can embody the same essential qualities as tra-
ditional relationships, thus justifying the notion of protecting these re-
lationships from government intrusion in the Fourth Amendment con-
text. 
 There is an additional element to the interpersonal privacy cases 
that is distinguishable in the Facebook context. In each of the afore-
mentioned interpersonal privacy cases, the Supreme Court struck down 
the government’s ability to interfere with relationships or a person’s 
ability to define them: in Roe v. Wade, this meant overturning a govern-
                                                                                                                      
437 See id. (holding that requiring the Boy Scouts to employ a homosexual male as a 
scoutmaster violated the Boy Scouts’ First Amendment right of expressive association). 
438 See Steven G. Gey, Reopening the Public Forum—From Sidewalks to Cyberspace, 58 Ohio 
St. L.J. 1535, 1611–17 (1998) (discussing the Internet as a potential public forum); Lyrissa 
Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 1975, 1995 (2011) (“It is hardly a stretch to charac-
terize an interactive social media site as a public forum when it is designed explicitly for 
providing a locus of discussion and debate.”). A rigorous analysis of the Internet as a pub-
lic or private forum is beyond the scope of this Article. 
439 Under a strict application of the Third Party Doctrine, this conclusion may make 
sense. Because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in communications over the 
Internet, this virtual space is better viewed as a public forum. 
440 As previously discussed, however, a subjective expectation of privacy does not dic-
tate whether such communication deserves Fourth Amendment protection. See supra notes 
107–129 and accompanying text. 
441 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating 
that “conversations in the open would not be protected against being overheard”) (cita-
tion omitted); Lee Tien, Cheap Surveillance, Essential Facilities, and Privacy Norms, 199 Stan. 
Tech. L. Rev. 10, at *8–9 (1999). 
442 The technosocial continuity theory makes this very point by arguing that the Inter-
net and virtual media can be seen as an extension of the home or office. See Strandburg 
supra note 25, at 654–64. This is different from when a person voluntarily makes public his 
or her Facebook profile and/or other posts. 
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ment ban on certain types of abortions;443 in Lawrence, this meant over-
ruling a state’s ban on sodomy;444 and in Dale, this meant preventing 
the government from prohibiting private groups from excluding cer-
tain individuals.445 In the Facebook context, however, there is no posi-
tive law at issue. Instead, the government simply seeks to acquire the 
information for law enforcement purposes. Nevertheless, this should 
not alter how we apply the concept of interpersonal privacy to Face-
book relationships. Much like in the face-to-face context, the govern-
ment’s ability to acquire Facebook communications would have similar 
deleterious effects when it comes to relationship formation over the 
Internet.446 Moreover, finding Fourth Amendment protection does not 
thwart the government’s interest because it preserves its ability to col-
lect information. Indeed, unlike the interpersonal privacy cases that 
foreclosed the government from employing the specific legislation, 
here, the government remains free to acquire the information as long 
as they have probable cause and a warrant.447 
2. Contexts for Protecting Facebook Communications Under 
Interpersonal Privacy 
 In order to examine the application of the concept of interper-
sonal privacy to Facebook relationships and the Fourth Amendment, 
the context to which that framework is applicable must be addressed. 
Would this concept apply to all Facebook communications? Does it 
matter if the communication is directed to one individual (or small 
group of individuals) or a person’s entire Facebook friend network? 
 First, any such concept of interpersonal privacy should apply only 
to communications that constitute a “relationship” —one that fosters 
identity, autonomy, and community.448 Second, how extensive that rela-
tionship is should factor into the analysis. The associations articulated 
in U.S. Jaycees may be instructive (though not dispositive) on whether a 
particular relationship merits protection.449 Under that framework, if 
the communications taken as a whole indicate the type of relationship 
where a person shares “not only a special community of thoughts, ex-
periences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one’s 
                                                                                                                      
443 410 U.S. 113, 162–64 (1973). 
444 539 U.S. at 567, 578. 
445 530 U.S. at 659. 
446 See supra notes 337–375 and accompanying text. 
447 See U.S. Const. amend. IV; supra notes 289–336 and accompanying text. 
448 See supra notes 340–367 and accompanying text. 
449 See supra notes 305–336 and accompanying text. 
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life,” this would suggest the type of association that should be pro-
tected.450 Thus, ongoing Facebook communications—including mes-
sages, posts, videos, and photographs—to a single person or small 
group of persons would probably constitute a relationship. By contrast, 
an isolated Facebook message to a user with whom there has been little 
prior contact probably would not constitute a relationship.451 Similarly, 
business-related messages—no matter how frequently exchanged— 
would not contain the deep attachment and commitments indicative of 
a relationship worthy of protection. 
3. The Role of Third Party Servers in Facebook Relationships 
 A key issue remains in this argument. Why do communications 
over Facebook merit privacy vis-à-vis the concept of interpersonal pri-
vacy when their face-to-face counterparts would not receive such pro-
tection, in light of similar considerations? Facebook relationships may 
indeed have the same qualitative structure of face-to-face relationships. 
But, as discussed earlier, communications made to another person in a 
face-to-face setting—even in the context of a bona fide “relationship” — 
do not merit privacy protection, and the other person is free to disclose 
the information to the government.452 Although interpersonal privacy 
focuses on preventing the government from interfering with essential 
aspects of a relationship, individuals assume the risk when they disclose 
communications to a third party—regardless of whether the recipient is 
a government informant.453 
 Facebook relationships work differently. Third party servers are 
integral to the relationship in a way that they obviously are not with 
                                                                                                                      
450 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620. 
451 See supra notes 382–425 and accompanying text. It is important to note here that 
Facebook recently implemented the ability to control what group or groups of people can 
view a user’s status update or posted photograph. This makes it easy to communicate more 
regularly or to relay more personal information to a small group of individuals like close 
friends or family. Of course, many users post updates and photographs for all of their 
Facebook friends to see. This certainly would complicate any interpersonal privacy analy-
sis. Should every communication to one’s entire Facebook friend network constitute part 
of the relationship or just a select few? This type of close factual analysis is beyond the 
scope of this Article. Indeed, a full analysis would require further explanation of the con-
tours of a Facebook relationship and exactly when a communication (e.g., post, e-mail, 
video) that is constituent of this relationship merits privacy protection. That said, the pre-
ceding is a compelling start to answering these questions. It is important to understand 
that the purpose of this Article is to begin the dialogue of applying the concept of inter-
personal privacy to the Internet, not to be the last word on the subject. 
452 See supra notes 53–106 and accompanying text. 
453 See supra notes 114–129, 337–375 and accompanying text. 
2013] Social Networking, Interpersonal Privacy, & the Third Party Doctrine 61 
face-to-face communications. Face-to-face relationships and the under-
lying communications do not involve any third party server or other 
intermediary; individuals speak directly with other individuals. The re-
cipient thus occupies dual roles. The recipient is both the potential 
government intrusion (i.e., a government agent) as well as part of the 
actual relationship. It makes sense then that there would be no inter-
personal privacy consideration when analyzing the privacy of these 
communications and the government’s ability to seize the information. 
As explained earlier, individuals assume the risk that the other per-
son(s) in the relationship may reveal information to the govern-
ment.454 This risk is inherent in the nature of any relationship. Indeed, 
one may argue that the very qualities of a relationship—autonomy, 
identity, and community—require the potential risk of disclosure. For 
only with this possibility of betrayal can any resulting relationship be 
considered genuine or authentic. 
 The transmission of Facebook communications—and the corre-
sponding risk involved—is qualitatively different. The relevant govern-
ment intrusion can be conceptually separated from the Facebook rela-
tionship itself. The components of this relationship include three parts: 
the sender, the recipient (i.e., Facebook friend(s)) and the ISP (i.e., 
Facebook, the company). No doubt each of these elements is necessary 
for the relationship, but one can conceptually remove the element of 
government intrusion from the relationship itself. 
 The potential intrusion comes into play with the server from 
which the government can acquire the information free from constitu-
tional restraint.455 The reason of course centers on the Third Party 
Doctrine and the fact that these communications lose any expectation 
of privacy as a result of this disclosure.456 Yet, the storage server or ISP 
is simply an intermediary who shares no part of the actual relationship. 
The server does not choose the communications or otherwise actively 
                                                                                                                      
454 See supra notes 337–375 and accompanying text. One scholar seems to think that 
where the other person in a relationship is a government informant, the government has 
gone too far and violated a person’s interpersonal privacy right. See Crocker, supra note 28, 
at 66–67. Yet, this scholar would have to acknowledge that if the other person voluntarily 
and independently (i.e., was not acting on behalf of the government) decided, after the 
fact, to reveal the communication to the government, there would be no protection. My 
point is that these two situations are identical, at least in terms of risk, and must stand or 
fall together. I take the position that such a risk is always present in a relationship, and thus 
any government intrusion does not change this basic calculus. Hence, interpersonal pri-
vacy considerations would not displace application of the Third Party Doctrine in either 
case. 
455 See supra notes 114–129 and accompanying text. 
456 See supra notes 114–129 and accompanying text. 
62 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:1 
participate in the relationship. It simply provides the “space” in which 
users can interact and develop relationships. In this way, the risk of 
government intrusion originates from something separate than the re-
lationship. Why then should an individual user bear the burden of this 
additional risk, when the server—the source of risk—makes no substan-
tive contribution to the relationship? The user should not. If society 
values the qualities inherent in Facebook relationships (as similar to 
those qualities in face-to-face relationships), it should protect these 
communications—as functions of the relationship—from this type of 
intrusion. 
 The technosocial theory seems to be on the right track with its ar-
gument about ISPs playing the role of middlemen.457 These service 
providers facilitate communications between individuals much like 
landlords or other providers, but there is an important difference. 
Landlords, maids, and other service individuals play a role—albeit a 
small one—in the relationship between the two individuals for whom 
they facilitate communication. They may not have a stake or preferred 
outcome in the matter. Nevertheless, they are a part of the resulting 
relationship in that they form a mini-relationship (perhaps not to the 
same depth or quality) with the sender and/or the recipient. In other 
words, they are not merely conduits that transmit information. This is 
very different from ISPs, which play no comparable role. The ISP entity 
is just an intermediary mechanism transmitting the information. The 
fact that that the server is a computer machine further enhances this 
point.458 No human interaction is taking place.459 In short, there is no 
relationship between either the sender or the recipient and the third 
party server. 
 This analysis, however, does not change the dynamic between the 
sender and the recipient of the Facebook communication—this inter-
action mimics that of a face-to-face communication. Individuals on 
Facebook—like their offline counterparts—assume the risk that one or 
more of their Facebook friends may betray their trust and reveal their 
                                                                                                                      
457 See supra notes 182–209 and accompanying text. 
458 See supra notes 139–164 and accompanying text. 
459 It would not matter if a Facebook employee “observed” the information for quality 
control or other related reasons. See supra notes 139–164 and accompanying text. Even 
here, the employee is in no way participating in the relationship or interacting with the 
sender or the recipient. 
My theory can also help explain the postal exception to the Third Party Doctrine. See 
supra notes 165–209 and accompanying text. There, too, the postal worker serves simply as 
an intermediary between the sender and the recipient of the letter, and has no substantive 
interaction with the parties. 
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communication. Interpersonal privacy considerations have no role to 
play here. This risk is inherent in any relationship, online or offline. We 
must be wary before communicating confidential information to a 
Facebook friend in the same way we must be cautious before revealing 
information to another individual in a face-to-face interaction. There is 
nothing to stop an undercover informant from becoming a user’s 
Facebook friend and acquiring purportedly confidential informa-
tion.460 This should not be surprising or alarming. As previously dis-
cussed, interpersonal privacy has no role here when applying the rea-
sonable expectation of privacy test.461 Unlike with the case of the third 
party sever, the Facebook “friend” —like the face-to-face counterpart— 
is part and parcel of the relationship. This risk of disclosure constitutes 
the necessary cost of engaging in this type of social interaction.462 
4. Other Internet Communications 
 The preceding discussion of interpersonal privacy has focused on 
communications in the context of social networking relationships, such 
as through Facebook. It intentionally excluded reference to other 
Internet communications, most notably e-mails transmitted over Gmail 
or Hotmail.463 These communications are more difficult to analyze. 
Because these communications follow the same pattern as Facebook 
communications—sender, non-participant third party server, and re-
cipient—it might be deceptively easy to conclude that these communi-
cations likewise merit Fourth Amendment protection in light of inter-
personal privacy considerations.464 But there is a key difference. Face-
book communications are constituent of the resulting relationship, 
whereas e-mail communications seem to simply facilitate their respec-
tive relationships. 
                                                                                                                      
460 See Semitsu, supra note 62, at 322–24, 344–48 (providing a good discussion of the 
various ways police officers can infiltrate Facebook networks and acquire incriminating 
evidence, including instances where governmental officials create fake “online identities” 
to gain access to a user’s Facebook communication). 
461 See supra notes 305–336 and accompanying text. 
462 A similar risk applies to those Facebook communications that are voluntarily made 
public to all users. Here, too, users take on the risk that someone may reveal the informa-
tion to the government. See Semitsu, supra note 62, at 342–43 (noting that when a user’s 
profile is public, the user has no reasonable expectation of privacy). 
463 This category would also include discrete Facebook communications that would 
not be considered as part of a Facebook relationship. See supra note 451 and accompanying 
text. 
464 See supra notes 114–129, 448–462 and accompanying text. 
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 Put differently, e-mails are similar to telephone conversations or 
postal letters. People use these methods of communications to main-
tain preexisting relationships or begin the process of making new ones. 
But these communications are hardly considered replacements for 
face-to-face meetings. For instance, exclusively talking on the phone is 
typically not considered a complete relationship, or at least the type of 
relationship that fosters qualities such as autonomy, identity, or com-
munity. Conversations are better seen as supplementing face-to-face 
relationships. 
 The same reasoning applies to e-mails. Like phone conversations, 
these communications typically facilitate relationships. They only allow 
individuals to send and receive messages as a way to supplement their 
existing offline relationships.465 Most individuals do not rely on this 
type of communication alone as a means to develop and maintain their 
relationships.466 This means that the communication is not, strictly 
speaking, necessary for the relationship. 
 If e-mail communications are used exclusively, this probably means 
that the sender and the recipient function more like business associates 
or acquaintances.467 Most would agree that this type of connection does 
not rise to the level of a relationship, or at least the kind of relationship 
that fosters the characteristics central to interpersonal privacy---identity, 
autonomy, and community. Indeed, no one really talks about a “Gmail 
relationship” or “Hotmail relationship.” These systems, although effec-
tive as means of communication, do not hold the same importance as 
social networking communications, which may be the only source of 
communication for the online relationship. 
 This is not to say that the ability instantaneously to send and re-
ceive e-mails over great distances was not a qualitative technological 
leap. It certainly was. But in other ways, this type of communication 
remains conceptually no different than more traditional forms of 
communication. Postal letters also allow individuals to send and receive 
communications over great distances. Although the communication 
                                                                                                                      
465 It is not clear that instant messaging via these sites changes the analysis. Even 
though these communications may occur in real-time, these communications would seem 
to be more similar to phone conversations than Facebook communications in that the 
former merely facilitate relationships. 
466 Cf. Hyo Kim et al., Configurations of Relationships in Different Media: FtF, Email, Instant 
Messenger, Mobile Phone, and SMS, 12 J. Computer-Mediated Comm. 1183, 1202–03 (2007) 
(discussing the use of phones as a way to reinforce existing social networks). 
467 These types of “relationships” would probably not rise to a level worthy of interper-
sonal privacy protection. See Crocker, supra note 28, at 22–32, 66–67. 
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takes longer to arrive, the basic concept remains the same—individual 
transmission of discrete messages. 
  This is what makes social networking sites so unique. For the first 
time in history, users have access to a wide variety of electronic tools— 
instant messages, posting of pictures, updates, videos—that can all be 
used in real-time. It is no wonder that social scientists and legal scholars 
alike have analyzed the unique social implications of this type of com-
munication. The end result is a relationship that is just as real as a tradi-
tional face-to-face one. The myriad number of Facebook communica-
tion tools (and their resulting effect) differentiates this type of interface 
from traditional e-mail systems, which constitute the mere exchange of 
discrete messages. Facebook communications are necessary for the 
online relationship. Without these communications, there would be no 
relationship. 
 Not all communications over the Internet benefit from such inter-
personal privacy considerations. A discrete e-mail sent to a business as-
sociate or acquaintance would lose all Fourth Amendment protection 
once it is disclosed to an ISP. This is an acceptable conclusion. The aim 
of this Article is to recognize the value of Internet relationships and 
protect the constituent communications, not seek to protect all com-
munications over the Internet.468 It also seems that incriminating 
statements would be most likely divulged in the context of relation-
ships, requiring greater protection for these communications from un-
warranted government intrusion. 
 There is room for debate here. The concept of interpersonal pri-
vacy could possibly apply to the Gmail or Hotmail communications, and 
thus serve as a means of overcoming the ISP disclosure problem. Per-
haps, an individual has developed a real “relationship” using only Gmail 
e-mails sufficient to warrant constitutional protection. Or maybe inter-
personal privacy considerations should be used to protect all Internet 
communications that facilitate preexisting relationships; this would still 
exclude discrete e-mails relating to work or business.469 
                                                                                                                      
468 Other theories, including those already discussed, may be employed to justify why 
these communications merit Fourth Amendment protection despite disclosure to an ISP. 
See supra notes 130–209 and accompanying text. My account is not intended to be the only 
way communications over the Internet can merit protection. It simply represents one way 
to protect those social networking communications that are constituent of a bona fide 
relationship. 
469 Again, this business versus personal dichotomy loosely tracks the analysis in U.S. Jay-
cees. See supra notes 319–323 and accompanying text. 
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 This would not substantially change the preceding analysis. My ba-
sic conclusion remains unassailed. There is a compelling argument to 
be made that interpersonal privacy considerations serve as a tool to ex-
plain why Facebook communications continue to merit Fourth Amend-
ment protection, even though these communications are systematically 
disclosed to third party servers.470 
C. Reevaluating a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Using  
Interpersonal Privacy 
 Invoking interpersonal privacy in the Internet context thus pro-
vides a new way to evaluate a user’s reasonable expectation of privacy— 
one that stands on constitutional principles—when it comes to Face-
book communications. After the Supreme Court’s 1967 decision, Katz 
v. United States, the objective part of the reasonable expectation test 
stands as the cornerstone of Fourth Amendment protection.471 Katz 
defines this as an “expectation . . . that society is prepared to recognize 
as ‘reasonable.’”472 The appropriate inquiry is whether a court finds 
that privacy is warranted in this context. How “reasonable” is defined in 
this context is not a simple matter.473 The Supreme Court has not 
adopted a single test for making this assessment.474 One scholar argues 
that the Court in fact uses four conceptually different models—or a 
combination thereof—when making this assessment: two descriptive 
and two normative.475 The two descriptive models focus on what a sen-
sible person would do in the situation or whether the authorities have 
                                                                                                                      
470 This conclusion does not disrupt how the law would analyze phone or postal com-
munications. Under Katz v. United States and its progeny, the Fourth Amendment already 
protects these communications. See 389 U.S. at 353; Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 
(1877). The insertion of interpersonal privacy here would thus be superfluous. 
Further, my analysis simply limits (not overrules) the holding in Smith v. Maryland to 
those transmissions disclosed to a machine that is not part of the relationship. See Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979); supra notes 90–106 and accompanying text. Be-
cause the phone numbers disclosed to the pen register are not substantive communica-
tions that are part of a relationship, under my theory, they would not garner special con-
sideration using the concept of interpersonal privacy. 
471 See supra notes 64–73, 90–106 and accompanying text. 
472 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
473 See Kerr, supra note 54, at 504. 
474 Id.; see, e.g., O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987) (“We have no talisman 
that determines in all cases those privacy expectations that society is prepared to accept as 
reasonable.”); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (“No single factor deter-
mines whether an individual legitimately may claim under the Fourth Amendment that a 
place should be free of government intrusion not authorized by warrant.”). 
475 Kerr, supra note 54, at 508. 
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violated preexisting law in conducting the search.476 The normative 
principles focus on the nature of the information searched and policy 
implications behind allowing this type of search.477 
 As previously discussed, scholars have tried numerous ways— 
automation/human observation, content/non-content distinction, and 
technosocial continuity—to apply this test and conclude that the user’s 
communications remain private despite the third party disclosure.478 
The merits of these decisions have already been discussed. Each of 
these theories—whether explicitly or implicitly—makes descriptive and 
normative assessments. What does a sensible Internet user think the 
role of service providers should be? Is there a qualitative difference be-
tween the information contained in the body of the e-mail and the in-
formation in the “to” and “from” lines? Can the user really disclose in-
formation and lose her privacy if the third party is a machine? These 
questions help assess whether a user has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in these communications. 
 Importing interpersonal privacy into this discussion serves a simi-
lar function. It, too, invokes the application of the foregoing normative 
and descriptive tests. The benefit of using the concept of interpersonal 
privacy is that any of these various tests (either alone or in combina-
tion) would be satisfied, and one could persuasively conclude that a 
user has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her social net-
working communications. 
 Under a descriptive model, it makes sense to say that a reasonable 
Facebook user would expect the government not to intrude on her 
Internet relationships because these relationships are just as “real” as 
face-to-face relationships. Invoking interpersonal privacy also means 
that the government is contravening constitutionally entrenched prin-
ciples—ones that seek to foster the interpersonal bonds in relation-
ships—by intercepting these communications. 
 Normative principles also support an expectation of privacy. These 
communications are more than just discrete transmissions. Indeed, un-
derstood as simply a single transmission, any Facebook communication 
would appear to be no different than other communications voluntar-
ily disclosed to a third party. But because this communication is under-
stood as a necessary constituent of a resultant relationship—one where 
the ISP serves merely as an intermediary—an argument can be made 
                                                                                                                      
476 Id. at 508–12, 516–19. 
477 Id. at 512–15, 519–22. 
478 See supra notes 130–209 and accompanying text. 
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that this transmission should be worthy of protection.479 Together these 
communications create relationships that can be just as deep and 
meaningful as face-to-face relationships. The concept of interpersonal 
privacy and the protection of interpersonal bonds—something the 
Court has recognized outside the Internet context—thus provides the 
normative framework to conclude that a person has a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in this Facebook communication. 
D. Applying Interpersonal Privacy Protection: A Real World Hypothetical 
 Take the following scenario to highlight the potential real-world 
application of the instant theory. Amit and Monica were mere ac-
quaintances in college and both joined the military after graduating. 
They were deployed in different parts of the world. Amit came across 
Monica through one of his Facebook friends and decided to “friend” 
her. She accepted. Over a period of months, they communicated very 
regularly. They video chatted, e-mailed, instant messaged, and even 
created a Facebook group that included only the two of them. This al-
lowed Amit and Monica to post pictures and updates that only these 
two could see. Although they did not see each other face-to-face during 
this period, they had strong feelings for each other and developed a 
very close relationship. Amit disclosed very private things about himself 
to Monica, and she did the same. 
 Now imagine the police back home are investigating a murder that 
occurred near campus while both were in school. They have suspicion 
that Amit may be involved. Further assume that Amit did send some-
thing incriminating to Monica regarding this murder. This could be an 
incriminating e-mail, post, or photograph. Under the Third Party Doc-
trine, there is no Fourth Amendment protection for this communica-
tion, as it was voluntarily disclosed to Facebook (an ISP).480 Accord-
                                                                                                                      
479 This type of analysis can be likened to the mosaic theory of privacy, where discrete 
public movements (with seemingly no Fourth Amendment protection) add up to some-
thing more significant that is worthy of protection. See supra note 280. Here, too, when 
discrete Facebook communications, which may not seem to merit Fourth Amendment 
protection, are taken together, they create something that is significant and worthy of pro-
tection. 
480 See supra notes 114–129 and accompanying text. Like all users, Amit accepted a 
Facebook agreement that detailed Facebook’s possession of these communications and 
their policies relating to disclosure. See supra notes 121, 139–164, 210–229 and accompany-
ing text. 
2013] Social Networking, Interpersonal Privacy, & the Third Party Doctrine 69 
ingly, the government can acquire the information from Facebook 
without probable cause for use against Amit at trial.481 
 The aforementioned theories by scholars would either not provide 
Fourth Amendment protection on their own terms or come at too high 
a cost. It is not clear, for instance, whether the automation/human ob-
servation distinction will work.482 For one thing, one would have to de-
termine whether the communication was in fact reviewed by Facebook 
employees, possibly in the context of a quality control review. More im-
portantly, a proponent of this theory would have to show why the po-
tential of review (based on Facebook’s own policies) would not vitiate 
protection. Similarly, the content/non-content theory may not provide 
protection in all instances.483 The incriminating communication could 
be a photograph or post, which would not readily be amenable to this 
type of analysis. The techno-social theory may indeed provide a frame-
work for protection but its application would come at too great a 
cost.484 This theory would also prevent government agents from acquir-
ing the information through surreptitious means. 
 This Article’s theory of interpersonal privacy squarely provides 
Fourth Amendment protection without sacrificing too much.485 The 
communication is part and parcel of a bona fide relationship and thus 
would pass the Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy 
test. Making this factual determination would be no different than any 
determination of whether Fourth Amendment protection applies. The 
only difference would be the factors analyzed. 
 Instead of looking at where and under what circumstances the 
communication was made (e.g., house, public area), the court will look 
to whether the communication was constituent of a relationship worthy 
of protection.486 If such a relationship existed when the communica-
                                                                                                                      
 
481 It is not clear that legislation would protect this communication from being used 
against Amit. For one thing, we could imagine that this particular incriminating commu-
nication was not read or otherwise downloaded by Monica for over 180 days because of an 
emergency deployment. Moreover, as previously discussed, even if the government were 
required to provide a warrant supported by probable cause but failed to get one, the SCA 
does not currently allow exclusion at trial as a remedy for mere violation of the statute. See 
supra notes 250–251 and accompanying text. 
482 See supra notes 139–164 and accompanying text. 
483 See supra notes 165–181 and accompanying text. 
484 See supra notes 182–209 and accompanying text. 
485 See supra notes 382–479 and accompanying text. 
486 Presumably, this would require the court to examine the nature and amount of the 
communications between Monica and Amit on the site and make a determination as to 
whether a relationship existed. One could imagine default rules that would allow pre-
sumptions in favor of Fourth Amendment protection unless the government proved oth-
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tion was made, under my theory, the fact that the communication was 
disclosed to an ISP would not matter. The government thus would re-
quire probable cause and a warrant before acquiring this information 
from Facebook.487 Yet, if Amit simply posted this incriminating infor-
mation for all his Facebook friends to see, this would militate against 
finding a relationship, and thus against protection of the constituent 
communication. Disclosure to the ISP then would be sufficient to viti-
ate any privacy interest. 
 My theory still preserves the government’s ability to use certain 
investigative tools free from Fourth Amendment scrutiny. The frame-
work simply seeks to put any bona fide social networking relationship 
on equal footing with its face-to-face counterpart. In other words, the 
government remains free to acquire the information from Monica. 
There would be no Fourth Amendment violation here. Similarly, the 
government may pose as a fake Facebook friend and seek to gather the 
information from Amit that way.488 These are the same risks that all of 
us face when disclosing something to a friend, whether online or off-
line. 
Conclusion 
 It is interesting how narrowly focused Fourth Amendment scholar-
ship has been when talking about the Internet and social networking 
sites like Facebook. Scholars have focused on the actual communica-
tion when trying to counter the Third Party Doctrine. This has led to 
various theories primarily focusing on the nature of the discrete com-
munication and the information being transmitted. To be sure, a sig-
nificant amount of ink has been spilled on how, if at all, the Third Party 
Doctrine should apply to these Internet communications. But this 
scholarship has failed to recognize the overall effect of these communi-
cations. In doing so, scholars have overlooked the importance of social 
                                                                                                                      
erwise. This Article is less concerned about the logistics of employing the concept of in-
terpersonal privacy (though this is certainly an important enterprise) and more interested 
in constructing the framework that would justify its use in the first place. 
487 There might be an exception to the warrant requirement that could apply. See, e.g., 
Crocker, supra note 28, at 67 (“Government may not intrude without invitation into pro-
tected interpersonal relations without a warrant or an established exception to the warrant 
requirement.”); supra note 54. If the government failed to obtain a warrant or an excep-
tion did not apply, the communication could not be used at trial against Amit. See Davis v. 
United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2423 (2011) (noting that the Court-created exclusionary 
rule bars introduction of evidence obtained by the government in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment). 
488 See Semitsu, supra note 62, at 322–24; supra notes 459–462 and accompanying text. 
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networking on the Internet and how the concept of interpersonal pri-
vacy may provide a unique way to avoid the pitfalls of the Third Party 
Doctrine. This Article finally begins this discussion. 
 It should come as no surprise that this Article does not adopt a 
static interpretation of the reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine. 
What is reasonable—whether interpreted as normative principle or de-
scriptive norm—will naturally change over time. This is particularly 
true as technology advances. Katz itself came at a time when individuals 
were using phones outside the home, thus warranting a change in the 
property-dominated framework of privacy protection. The same is true 
today. A reasonable expectation of privacy assessment must go beyond 
the analysis of communications as communications. It must recognize 
the unique role that Internet communications play in creating and 
maintaining relationships. 
 This focus on interpersonal privacy does not mean that the Third 
Party Doctrine has no effect in today’s technology-based world. There 
may still be appropriate applications. Single e-mails over systems like 
Gmail or Hotmail (e.g., business e-mails) may not necessarily rise to the 
level of having a reasonable expectation of privacy under my frame-
work because they are not part of a bona fide relationship. 
 Outside the communication context, this doctrine also remains a 
viable mechanism by which Fourth Amendment protection can be lost. 
Take the Jones case and the use of GPS technology. Assuming the device 
was property installed, my argument would not alter the third party dis-
closure implications. Because a car’s movements are disclosed to the 
public at large, there would be no expectation of privacy. The concept 
of interpersonal privacy plays no countervailing role because there is 
obviously no relationship to speak of this situation. There may be other 
reasons why individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
these public movements, but this has not been my focus. 
 This Article has exclusively analyzed how interpersonal privacy 
considerations can be introduced into the discussion of Fourth 
Amendment protection as it relates to Facebook communications. To 
this end, the Article presents a different way of thinking about the 
Internet and our corresponding Fourth Amendment rights. 
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